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Experience with Temporary Workers: Some Evidence from Selected European Countries

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Experience with Temporary Workers:
Some Evidence from Selected European Countries

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by

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1. Introduction

At the beginning of the sixties, continental European countries had overcome the damages of the Second World War, but structural shortages of unskilled labour occurred. This led European economies to open up their national labour markets and to welcome the immigration of unskilled workers who had some cultural or historical links to the immigrant societies. Germany and Switzerland established so called "guest worker systems," allowing people from Southern European economies to enter temporarily to work, but to return home after a few years. Sweden welcomed thousands of Finnish manual workers (Westin 1994; Fischer and Straubhaar 1996). France and the United Kingdom accommodated relatively openly members of their (former) colonies (Coleman 1995; Salt 1995a, 1995b).

The migration movements to Germany and Switzerland had been expected to be temporary. Young men from the South were supposed to come without their families, to work hard in low-skilled, low-paying jobs (i.e. construction, service sector), to save most of their income and to return home to their families as relatively wealthy people after having spent their few years as "guests." Consequently, Germany and Switzerland did not pass any immigration laws. They just had an "Ausländerrecht." Immigrants have been treated as "foreigners" or in a more kindly formulation as "guests." Issues of permanent settlement and integration are rarely expressed, and topics like (dual) citizenship or a change from the *ius sanguinis* to the *ius solis* principles have been addressed only recently. Actually, in post-Kohl Germany, the red-green coalition has immediately announced that they will modernize the German alien law and allow for dual citizenship after eight years of permanent stay in Germany.

The urgent need of a change of the traditional view of the "guest worker" or "foreigner" approach can easily be demonstrated by its failures: Switzerland has the highest proportion of foreign population in the total population, and of foreign workers in the total labour force of all European countries (with the exception of tiny Luxembourg), Germany has emerged as the principal immigration country in Europe with inflows of about 700–800,000 foreigners per year (OECD 1997, 1998). This is not only due to the numbers but also to the fact that more and more

the guest worker policy has lost its legitimacy because of humanitarian reasons (family reunification, asylum seekers, refugees).

In what follows, I will shortly describe some stylized changes in the European migration patterns in the last three decades (Section 2). Section 3 presents Switzerland as a typical case study for the failures of the guest worker system. In Section 4, I will present my conclusions.

2. Some Stylized European Migration Patterns in the Last Three Decades

a) *From intra-EU migration to migration from the outside into the EU*

The pattern of migratory movements both into the EU and within the EU has changed considerably since the 1960s. Migration from outside the EU has increasingly gained importance. Today, immigration flows from third-world countries make up the greater part of EU migratory movements.

b) *From economically demand-determined to humanitarian supply-driven migration flows*

In the sixties and seventies, the migration flows within the EU and from the outside have mainly been demand determined by the shortages of the receiving EU labour markets.[1] The migration flows to Germany or to Switzerland provide a good example. Figure 1 depicts annual immigration propensities to Germany (immigration in per cent of total population, left hand scale) against the development of the West-German unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted, right hand scale). At the beginning of the 1960s, the immigration propensity of (non-national) migrants from outside the EU was still below that of EU immigrants. During the seventies and eighties, immigration from other EU countries remained at the low level of below 0,5 immigrants per 100 inhabitants with a falling trend and little variation. Immigration of non-nationals from outside the EU[2] increased sharply during the last thirty years. At the end of the eighties, it approached the (relatively low) level of German internal mobility. Although showing similar variation patterns as

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[1] Various more-reliable econometric analyses confirm the predominantly demand-determined character of immigration from relatively lower-developed Mediterranean countries into the EU. See Straubhaar (1988) for an in-depth analysis.

intra-EU immigration, extra-EU immigration has exhibited much stronger fluctuations then intra EU-flows. These fluctuations can be related to GDP growth, employment growth and unemployment rates. The most obvious relation is the strongly symmetric behaviour of third-world country immigration and *unemployment rates* shown in Figure 1. A decrease in West German unemployment rates has been associated with an increase in third-country immigration and increases in unemployment clearly led to decreases of immigration rates. To the extent that unemployment rates are good proxies for (business-cycle determined) labour demand, Figure 1 suggests that immigration into Germany has indeed been *demand* determined, especially as far as immigration from outside the EU is concerned.

More recently, the migratory flows from third-world countries are increasingly dominated by humanitarian reasons (refugees and asylum seekers). This channel functions largely as a substitute for direct labour-market oriented immigration into the EU, which has been made considerably more difficult since the beginning of the 1980s. The number of asylum seekers in the EU has also risen markedly since the beginning of the 1980s. Germany in particular has become the most important EU destination for asylum seekers. While in 1983, only just short of 20,000 applications for asylum were made in Germany, in 1992 the figure was almost 440,000, and in 1993 — following a change in the asylum procedure on 1st July, 1993 which involved, in particular, the definition of "safe third-world countries" — the figure was still over 320,000 (cf. Federal Statistical Office 1995). That these applications for asylum often represent attempts to circumvent other "congested" immigration channels is demonstrated by the recognition ratio. Whereas at the beginning of the 1970s, in Germany about 40% of applications for asylum were recognized as being justified, the recognition ratio fell at the beginning of the 1990s to 3–4%.

c) *From legal to illegal migration flows*

Another channel that acts as a substitute for demand-determined legal labour migration is illegal migration. Illegal immigration has become a heated public debate in most Western European countries and it is politicized by right-wing parties such as the "Front National" in France, the "Freiheitlichen" in Austria, and the "Republicans" in Germany. Illegal migrants break laws and

[2] The migration figures for Germany given here all exclude Germans and thus also the so-called "Aussiedler," – German origin "returnees" from the East – whose number amounted to approximately 2.3 million people

rules and clearly provoke the credibility of judicial systems and the confidence in the power and authority of constitutional settings. They also challenge the public transfer system. Illegal foreign workers do not pay direct income taxes, but use, on the other hand, public goods or publicly subsidized services like schooling or medical treatments for their children. Illegals compete with legals for job opportunities but have the possibility of avoiding certain obligations, costs, taxes and fees that are compulsory for the legal workers. These legal, economic and social provocations make it easily understandable that politicians and their voters are not willing to accept the phenomenon of illegal migration.

Regardless of these negative impacts on the host society, however, illegal migration exists and it is growing all over the world. And this is not only due to the vehement and irreversible will of hopeless and desperate people from poor regions to enter the promised land of wealth and glory. There is also a need and demand for illegal immigrants. Some people (like home owners needing help in cleaning and maintenance) and economic groups (like restaurant owners or farmers) benefit from illegal migrants. They try to avoid direct labour costs, indirect social payments and costly regulations. The supply of and demand for illegal foreign workers create an economic market for illegal migration and a political market for the supply and demand of border controls and labour market regulations. Consequently, the phenomenon of illegal migration has to be analyzed within an economic framework but also with an understanding of the political economy behind the setting of laws and rules.

An economically efficient way to handle illegal immigration and illegal work starts at the economic roots of illegal employment of illegal foreigners. This means first, that national labour markets should be made more flexible. Illegal immigrants work very often without written *de facto* contracts. Why not allow them or others to work *de jure* under the same conditions? If labour is not available on the official labour market, employers have to resort to illegal sub-markets. Opening up the labour market and giving easier access to newcomers is an appropriate strategy.

Illegal employment of natives and of foreigners is the consequence and not the cause of inefficiencies on the labour market. Finding and eliminating the cause and nature of those

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immigrated between 1968 and 1994 (German Statistical Yearbooks).

inefficiencies presents the only possible long-term strategy to lower the economic incentives for illegal immigration. A good labour market policy is the only valid strategy fighting illegal employment and will more or less automatically cure the most obvious problems of illegal migration.

d) ***From blue-collar to white-collar migration***

At the beginning of the sixties, the "guest workers" were supposed to work in relatively low-qualified jobs such as construction and standardized industrial work on assembly lines (cf. outline 1). The demand for guest workers was met on the one hand by the supply from less-developed regions within the Community (particularly from Italy) and on the other hand from the "traditional" southern European hiring countries — Turkey and Yugoslavia.

With progressing world-wide economic integration, and further international specialization and economic development, the European economies have increasingly lost competitiveness in labour-intensive productions requiring large-scale employment of unskilled workers. To keep their relatively higher wage level, European economies had to specialize in the production and provision of high productivity work, which demands correspondingly higher skills. Consequently, in the 1990s, the demand for foreign workers in northwestern Europe shows a completely different skill pattern than in the sixties. Demand for highly skilled specialists now dominates. These are recruited mainly within the EU or in other OECD countries. The relatively low demand for unskilled foreign workers is met, in contrast, by immigration (including illegal immigration) from third-world countries.

In southern Europe the demand for foreign workers in the 1990s shows the same skills pattern as that in northwestern Europe in the 1960s. Southern Europe today has become an immigration region. The main demand is for unskilled workers. This demand is met largely by workers from North Africa, eastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. It is an attempt to meet the weak demand for highly skilled specialists mainly within the EU.

A relatively new trend is that inner-EU migration is very often also inner-firm migration, i.e. it takes the form of a cross-border placement or transfer within the "internal labour market" of a multinational enterprise. In future it can be expected that the importance of this form of migration

within Europe will continue to increase with the growing Europeanization of large numbers of previously national enterprises. The resulting migration, often termed the “Euro-mobility” of “Euro-specialists,” can take different forms, however. It need not necessarily have a permanent character, precisely because of the geographical proximity within Europe, but can instead take place in the form of relatively temporary, shorter-term (project-oriented) migration, such as weekly stays or business trips or as periodic commuter movements. The emerging “Euro-regions” are doing their best to strengthen this new form of migration as well as cross-border commuting.

As some unskilled work — especially in the service sector — is not tradable, a limited need for unskilled work will persist, however. Because these simple jobs ought to be low paid and thus relatively unattractive for natives, some demand for immigration of unskilled is likely to remain. At present, however, unskilled labour in most European countries suffers from particularly high unemployment rates, and with further economic development and structural change, large-scale demand for unskilled immigrants is likely to continue to decrease.

e) *Trade and capital flows as substitutes for migration*

Mundell (1957) demonstrated in his pioneering article that *in a neo-classical world* of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S)-type labour migration, trade and international capital flows may substitute for each other. In more advanced models of international transactions (allowing for persistent international differences in production technology, increasing returns to scale and the existence of non competitive markets), trade and factor flows may become mutually complementary (see outline 2). To make a long story short, international migration can be the consequence of different sources:

1) Labour mobility can be a reaction to existing trade impediments (as in Mundell's (1957) case) or a reaction to the physical non-tradability of certain goods, which prevent “goods for goods” trade (as in the Krauss [1976] case). In the absence of commodity trade, emigration from the labour-abundant country would reduce factor price disparities, thereby driving commodity prices together and reducing the basis for international commodity trade. In this sense, international labour migration is a substitute, whole or partial, for international commodity trade.

2) Labour mobility can be a reaction to the existence of intersectorally immobile factors (as in the specific-factors model). In this case, international labour migration is a substitute for an imperfect intersectoral factor mobility within a given country and it takes place as long as international trade and capital flows themselves do not produce factor-price equalization. Thus, international commodity trade plus international labour migration causes factor-price equalization, regardless of endowment differences and factor-intensity reversals. International labour migration allows international commodity trade to substitute completely for both international capital movements and the movements of sector-specific factors (equivalently, international commodity trade allows international labour migration to substitute for capital mobility).

3) Labour migration may reflect a reaction to international differences in labour productivity due to the persistence of internationally different production technologies, the existence of increasing economies of scale or imperfect markets. If this international reallocation of labour increases the degree of comparative advantage, commodity trade will also be stimulated. In that case, commodity trade and international labour migration are complements rather than substitutes (as in the cases of Markusen [1983] and Ethier [1984]).

4) Labour mobility may be the consequence of a trade in services or service components that cannot be transmitted via telecommunications.

5) If local economies of scale allow for more efficient production, then labour mobility (and people's willingness to move where scale economies may be realized) helps to build up agglomerations and centres of economic activities and consequently it might lead to a core–periphery pattern of development (Krugman 1991a, b). In this case, migration leads to divergent growth paths.

6) If highly developed and specialized economies experience asymmetric macroeconomic shocks, labour mobility can be an effective and efficient short-run adjustment mechanism thus avoiding persistent unemployment increases and structural problems (Blanchard and Katz 1992). In this case, migration corrects for trade and internal labour market inefficiencies.

In the first, second and sixth instances, the international movement of workers is a substitute for a trade in commodities where this is prohibited by law or rendered impossible by technical factors. In cases three, four, and five, the international mobility of labour and international trade tends to be complementary rather than substitutive. So, theory is not self evident. What does the empirical evidence tell us?

Within the European Union, we clearly see a tendency toward the typical H-O-S world with relatively similar production technologies. Consequently, trade and capital flows have worked rather well as substitutes for migration. The adjustments toward both factor and price equalization took place, above all, via the trade in goods and services and capital transfers, and not so much via the migration of workers. The trade in goods and international capital transfer reacted much more elastically to the formation of the Single Market than did the supply of labour. The reduction of protectionist barriers led to a strong growth in inner-Community trade and in inner-Community direct investment. To a large extent the trade in goods and capital transfers made the migration of labour unnecessary (see Straubhaar 1988).

3. Switzerland as a Case Study[3]

a) *Some background information*

The development of the Swiss economy in the last 150 years since the foundation of the Swiss federal state, has been markedly influenced by the immigration of foreign workers. Since 1850, the share of the immigrant population has risen from merely 3% to almost 20%. Compared to other OECD countries, Switzerland has – together with Luxembourg and Australia – by far the highest share of foreigners in total population and employment (see Table 1).

The historical experience of migration to Switzerland can be subdivided into three main periods. The first period lasted until 1963 and was characterized by a liberal admission policy, with the exception of the time from 1914 until 1945. The second period began in 1963 when the Swiss government introduced restrictions on the admission of immigrants. The third period started in 1991, when the Swiss government decided to review the Swiss migration policy and

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[3] This section is a reproduction from Golder and Straubhaar (1998) and the data base is Golder (1999). I concentrate my presentation on Switzerland because the German case is broadly analyzed by Bauer (1998), Bauer/Zimmermann (1997) and Zimmermann (1997).

switch to an admission policy that was based on country-of-origin considerations. In October 1998 the Swiss government agreed to move away from the three-circle policy of 1991 and toward a two-circle model. This means that as of 1999 the migration from the EU to Switzerland should become more or less completely liberalized and the migration from third-world countries to Switzerland should more or less be restricted to high-skilled workers.

The Swiss migration policy was and still is largely dominated by economic interests, mainly labour market considerations. The principle idea after World War II was that immigrants should help to smooth business cycles on the labour market, with immigration of foreign workers during economic upswings and remigration during downswings, thereby stabilizing the employment of natives. As it was believed that immigrants would come to Switzerland only temporarily, thereby implying a high 'rotation' of foreign workers, this goal could easily be achieved. Migration policy could thus be used as an instrument for labour market and business cycle policy (for the different categories of residence and the various goals of the Swiss migration policy see Table 2 and Table 3).

Over time, however, it turned out that a large share of the inflow of foreign workers was not temporary but permanent. The combination of a liberal admission of immigrant workers during the 1950s and 1960s together with a declining rotation led to a substantial increase in the stock of foreigners living in Switzerland. As a result of the focus on the recruitment of foreign workers in the post-war period, Hoffmann-Nowotny and Kilias (1979: 55) concluded that the Swiss migration policy during this period could be characterized as "... maximizing immigration while minimizing the immigrants chances of integration."

The growing stock of foreigners as well as the inflationary pressures of the booming Swiss economy intensified the claims for public interventions to control the inflow of new immigrants towards the end of the 1950s. In 1963, the Swiss government – for the first time after World War II – introduced measures to control and limit the inflow of new immigrant workers, with ceilings on immigrant worker employment applying at the company level. These measures turned out to be largely ineffective in limiting the inflow of foreign workers, with the share of foreigners in total population rising from 10.8% in 1960 to 17.2% in 1970 (see Table 4).

After the economic downswing in the 1970s, which led to a decrease in immigration, the upswing at the beginning of the 1980s again triggered a substantial influx of immigrant workers. Together with other forms of migration, such as family and refugee migration, the share of foreigners in total population rose to 18.1% in 1990. With the recession at the beginning of the 1990s, immigration declined again, while the overall share of foreigners in total population rose to 19.6% and to 34% in total employment in 1995 respectively.[4] This steady increase in the number of foreigners living in Switzerland, together with a shift in the structure of the immigrants with respect to migration motives as well as countries of origin led to a reorientation of the Swiss immigration policy at the beginning of the 1990s. As can be seen from Table 5, the share of immigrants without employment has increased substantially from 15% in 1960 to 65% in 1995. This shift can be explained by the declining share of labour immigration and the rising share of family and refugee immigration.

Of special interest is the cyclical buffer function of foreigners during recession years. The recession of the mid-1970s hit Switzerland more intensively than other Western European countries. Between 1974 and 1976, employment decreased by almost 250,000 persons, which corresponded to almost 7.6% of total employment. This reduction in employment was mainly borne by immigrants, as the reduction in foreign worker employment was around six times greater than for Swiss workers. With respect to the period from 1973 to 1977, employment of Swiss workers declined by only 1.1% compared to 25.5% for foreigners. Overall, 75% of the decline in employment was borne by the non-resident population, 17% by the resident population, i.e. Swiss and immigrants with a residence permit, and only 8% by an increase in the Swiss unemployment rate (OECD 1995).

The recession at the beginning of the 1980s had a much smaller impact on employment in Switzerland. Although employment declined between 1982 and 1984, this decrease amounted to merely 2.1% of total employment. The extent to which foreign workers have served as cyclical buffers during this recession is more difficult to evaluate, because the number of employed Swiss declined by 2.9% during this period, while the number of employed foreigners declined only in 1983 with an overall increase of 0.8% between 1982 and 1984. This is remarkable as immigrants

[4] Foreigners with seasonal and commuter permits are included in these numbers.

are not only characterized by a lower skill level compared to natives but also by a more disadvantageous sectoral distribution than natives (Schwarz 1985). These results have to be qualified when the employment performance of immigrants compared to natives is considered, which reveals that the unemployment rate for immigrants was substantially higher than for natives (see Golder 1999).

Two main reasons for the diverging development between the recession of the 1970s and the 1980s, i.e. the decreasing importance of the cyclical buffer function of immigrants, can be put forward (cf. Fischer and Straubhaar 1996). First, the stock of manoeuverable foreign workers dropped substantially over that period, as the share of immigrants holding a residence permit increased from 30.8% in 1973 to 51.7% in 1981. Second, there were substantial demographic differences between Swiss and foreign employees. Retirements between 1982 and 1984 amounted to 3.3% of the employed for Swiss and to 0.8% for foreigners (Schwarz 1988). As a result, retirements of Swiss employees exceeded the decline in employment, whereas the number of retirements and the decline in employment for foreign employees balanced out. As there has not been a reduction in employment, it is obvious to assess the cyclical buffer function of foreigners by means of unemployment figures, which reveal that foreigners were hit much harder by the recession of the 1980s than were natives (see Golder 1999).

To summarize: there are major differences between Switzerland and traditional immigration countries, such as the United States, Canada or Australia. First, in contrast to these countries, Switzerland has never considered itself as an immigration country, as it was generally believed that foreign workers coming to Switzerland would stay only temporarily. As a result, the official terminology in Switzerland has not used the term “immigrant,” but rather terms such as “foreigners,” “foreign workers” or “aliens.”

Second, naturalization of immigrants in Switzerland is very restrictive. In contrast to countries such as the United States or Canada where the “ius solis” applies, i.e. citizenship depends on where one is born, the “ius sanguis” applies in Switzerland, i.e. citizenship depends on the citizenship of the parents. Immigrants have to live at least 12 years in Switzerland before they can apply for Swiss citizenship. The naturalization rate is accordingly very low compared to other industrial countries.

b) *Some Stylized Facts*

This section presents some stylized facts on the demographic characteristics, the qualification structure and the sectoral distribution of the immigrant population in Switzerland. As the reference group for the analysis we will use the native population. The descriptive statistics are drawn from a new micro dataset available for Switzerland, the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS). The dataset has been made available for the purpose of studying migration patterns for Switzerland by Golder (1999).

Demographic Characteristics: Table 6 reveals five important demographic characteristics of immigrants compared to natives. First, it is apparent that with an increasing duration of stay, the weight of those guest-worker nations that formed the first immigration waves increases. Almost 75% of all foreigners who lived at least 15 years in Switzerland in 1995 came from Italy, Spain and Germany. Second, a shift in the countries of origin to countries like Portugal, Turkey, the former Yugoslavia and other Non-European countries has taken place over time, especially since the upswing of the 1980s. Third, and related to the previous issue, the increasing share of immigrants from Non-European countries reflects the refugee movements to Switzerland that started mainly in the 1980s. Fourth, the nationality of the majority of second-generation immigrants by and large coincides with the nationalities of the first immigration wave, as their parents originated mainly from traditional guest-worker countries. Fifth, the age at immigration has increased over time. One explanation for this development can be found in the increasing share of family migration. Another is that immigrants from industrial countries generally come to Switzerland after they have finished their education. As the share of secondary and tertiary education in these countries is rather high, they will accordingly be older than immigrants from other, less-industrialized countries when they come to Switzerland (see also Table 7).

Table 7 presents evidence on the duration of stay of the three nationality groups. Two findings are noteworthy. First, the consideration of different nationality groups reveals that more than 60% of all immigrants have lived in Switzerland for at least 15 years. These results therefore confirm the findings of Table 6. It is notable that more than 50% of the second generation of immigrants are Italians. Second, as already mentioned in the previous paragraph, there are marked

differences with respect to the age at immigration between the three nationality groups. These findings lead us to conclude that there is substantial variation between immigrant cohorts as well as between nationality groups.

Qualification Structure: With respect to the qualification structure, three important issues are evident from Table 8. First, immigrants with lower educational attainment levels cluster mainly in the early immigration cohorts. A large share of the low-skilled immigrants arrived in the 1950s and 1960s as guest-workers. They were mainly employed in the construction and production industries. Second, the structure of education has changed substantially over time. Those immigrants who have arrived within the last 5 years exhibit a more favourable educational profile than previous immigration cohorts. Nevertheless, it must be noted that there is a substantial share of immigrants not reporting any education level in recent immigration cohorts. This can be attributed to the increasing number of immigrants from non-European countries. Third, when the educational profiles of Swiss and immigrants are compared, it can be seen that immigrants are not only more heavily concentrated in the lower educational segments, but that there are also more foreigners than Swiss who have a university degree. This puzzle can be solved when looking at the qualification structure of the three nationality groups in Table 9.

As can be seen in Table 9, the lower educational level can mainly be attributed to immigrants from Southern European and non-European countries. In contrast, immigrants from Northern European countries are mainly responsible for the higher share of foreigners holding a university degree. The comparison between men and women reveals that the latter are in general more concentrated in the lower educational segments among foreigners as well as among natives.

Sectoral Distribution: The analysis of the sectoral distribution of natives and immigrants in Table 10 does not provide a clear picture, as both groups exhibit large shares in the industrial and the service sector. The distinction between the three nationality groups reveals however that immigrants from Northern European countries are more heavily concentrated in the service sector while immigrants from the other two groups are more heavily concentrated in the industrial sector. Additionally, immigrants from Northern European countries as well as Swiss are predominantly concentrated in those segments of the service sector that require skilled workers, such as sector 7.

Three things are noteworthy when the sectoral distribution of immigrants with respect to immigrant cohorts is considered (Table 11). First, there is not only a rather large variation across cohorts but also across sectors. It is therefore difficult to draw conclusions on intertemporal changes in the sectoral composition from Table 11. Nevertheless it can be seen that immigrants from earlier cohorts are more heavily concentrated in the secondary sector compared to immigrants from more recent cohorts, which are more concentrated in the tertiary sector. The share of immigrants working in the manufacturing and the construction sector has especially decreased substantially over time. Second, the sectoral composition of second generation immigrants reveals that, while a large share is still working in traditional guest-worker sectors, at the same time the share of immigrants working in the tertiary sector is larger compared to other cohorts.

c) Summary

Three conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of Switzerland as a special case study for temporary movements. First, Switzerland has experienced a large influx of immigrants over the last 50 years. While Swiss migration policy was initially liberal, it became increasingly restrictive from the 1960s onwards. Although the policy aimed for temporary migration, in fact a large share of the immigrants remained permanently in Switzerland. Over time, the composition of the immigrant population has changed considerably with respect to the countries of origin, with a shift to peripheral European and non-European countries, as well as with respect to the motives for migration, with a shift to family and refugee migration.

Second, Swiss migration policy has largely been dominated by economic interests, mainly labour market considerations, which favoured special interests of certain sectors and regions. It was generally believed that a migration policy could be used as an instrument for stabilization and regional policy as well as to promote economic growth. The analysis of the economic effects of migration however shows that this policy has rather harmed the development of the Swiss economy.

Third, the presentation of the stylized facts reveal that immigrants in general exhibit a less favourable socio-demographic profile than natives. This conclusion must be qualified, however, when different nationality groups are distinguished. In this case, the above conclusion holds only for immigrants from Southern European and non-European countries, while immigrants from Northern European countries exhibit even a better profile than natives.

4. Conclusions

The experiences of Switzerland and Germany clearly reveal that he European "guest-worker" programmes look tempting politically but have turned out to be completely ineffective in reality. The intention has failed to restrict the inflow of foreigners to workers, to keep their duration of stay temporary and to treat them as guests but not as equals. Migration flows to Switzerland, Germany and other Western European countries have become a barely manageable and sometimes self-dynamic dimension. Network and family migration are legitimized by humanitarian or moral reasons. If it is not permitted legally, it happens illegally by "overstayers" and undocumented residents. These people want to stay as long as they can, but definitely longer than just for seasonal or temporary work. Economically driven, demand-determined labour migration has been replaced by a supply driven inflow of family members and people seeking conditions in which to survive (politically and economically).

The concept of "guests" or "foreigners" is socially and economically misleading. Temporary migration in the law books has been replaced in reality by permanent settlement. Immigrants to Western Europe have stayed and are becoming long-term residents without the same political and individual rights as natives. Guest workers were not allowed to move freely and without restriction from one employer to another within the EU or within Switzerland and consequently provoked an economically inefficient and inflexible allocation of labour. They were supposed to pay taxes but were not allowed to vote on the use of their contributions. They were treated as production factors but not as equal people. According to the *ius sanguinis* principle, aliens remain foreigners their whole life and they have to assimilate their habits to the rules of the host society. Some time ago, Swiss writer Max Frisch said: "man hat Arbeitskräfte gerufen . . . und es kamen Menschen!" (workers have been recruited, and people have come). The more unlike

these people were in relation to their host society, the more obvious to the natives were their cultural, religious and personal differences. Spontaneous and virulent conflicts were one consequence; the political success of radical and often racist right-wing parties was another. These basic political conflicts within the host society are not weakened by a "guest worker" policy. In fact, such a policy, only serves to increase tensions.

In all Western European countries, the concept of "guest workers" has been abandoned. The left-wing parties in power in many EU member states have strongly supported stronger integration policies and the concept of dual citizenship. The new red-green coalition in Germany will change the law regarding aliens and allow for dual citizenship. Switzerland will liberalize its immigration policy against the EU countries and strengthen the restrictions against immigration from third-world countries. So, with the structural change from mass employment in labour-intensive standard industry activities toward knowledge and service-based economies, Western European societies have also changed their anachronistic view of temporary movements of guest workers to a concept of permanent residency and integration. This change is economically and socially positive and a good move at the right time.

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Figure 1: Immigration propensities and unemployment in Germany



Datasource: Eurostat (var. editions).

Outline 1:

Stylised labour demand and supply patterns and migration demand in the 1960s and 1990s

a) Western and Northern Europe, 1960s



b) Western and Northern Europe, 1990s



Source: Böhning (1995:53)


Outline 2:
Models of Substitution and Complementarity
in International Trade Theory
International Trade Theory (ITT)
- competitive markets
- no economies of scale
- identical demand
Traditional ITT
- imperfect competition
- scale effects
- unequal production technology
Modern ITT
- labour and capital
- identical production technology
- unequal factor intensities
Neoclassical ITT (H-O-S-models)
- only labour
- unequal production technology
- unequal labour productivity
Classical ITT (Ricardo-models)
- production specific factors
- sector specific immobility
Specific factors-models
- product-differentiation
- technological advantage
- demand preferences
Imperfect com-petition-models
- complete national mobility of production factors (both spatial and sectorial)
- complete international immobility of production factors
Substitution models
- international mobility of production factors
Complementarity models
legal/administrative trade restrictions
natural trade restrictions
free trade possible
Trade in goods as a substitute for factor movements
free trade restricted
Factor movements as a subsitute for (impossible) trade in goods
free trade and factor mobility
Trade in goods induces factor movements

Tab. 1: Share of foreigners and share of foreign born[1] in selected OECD countries, 1993

Country	*Foreign Population in 1'000*	*Employed Foreigners in*	*Foreign Population in %*	*Employed Foreigners in %*
Belgium	921	340	9.1	8.3
Denmark	189	54	3.6	1.9
Germany	6'878	3'432	8.5	8.8
Finland	56	–	1.1	–
France	3'597	1'544	6.3	6.2
UK	2'001	1'026	3.5	3.6
Ireland	94	40	2.7	3.0
Italy	987	–	1.7	–
Japan	1'321	–	1.1	–
Luxembourg	125	65	31.1	38.6
Netherlands	780	278	5.1	3.9
Norway	162	48	3.8	4.5
Austria	690	305	8.6	9.6
Sweden	508	221	5.8	5.1
Spain	430	82	1.1	0.5
Switzerland	1'260	726	18.1	21.7
Australia	4'125	2'164	22.7	24.8
Canada	4'343	2'681	15.6	18.5
USA	19'767	11'636	7.9	9.3

Source: Haug (1995), SOPEMI (1995)
Note: [1] For Australia, Canada and the United States the figures refer to foreign born in 1991

Tab. 2: Residence categories

Validity	*Residence Category*	*Immigration Quota*
Short term	Seasonal permit	Yes
Short term	Short stayer permit	Yes
Short term	Commuter permit	No
Medium term	One-year permit	Yes
Long term	Residence permit	No

Source: own description

Tab. 3: Goals of the Swiss migration policy

Explicit goals	1.	Well-balanced Relation between the stock of Swiss and foreign residents (**stabilisation goal**)
	2.	Creation of a favourable framework to integrate foreigners living and working in Switzerland (**integration goal**)
	3.	Improvement of the labour market structure and cyclically balanced employment (**labour market structure and business cycle goal**)
Implicit goals	4.	Protection of domestic workers, i.e. Swiss and permanent residents
	5.	Support of peripheral regions
	6.	Preservation of prevailing economic structures

Source: own presentation

Tab. 4: Development of the stock of foreigners in Switzerland in %, 1850-1990

Year	*Total Population in (1'000)*	*Swiss (in 1'000)*	*Foreigners (in 1'000)*	*Share of foreigners in %*
1850	2'393	2'321	72	3.0
1860	2'510	2'396	115	4.6
1870	2'655	2'518	151	5.7
1880	2'832	2'635	211	7.5
1890	2'918	2'688	230	7.9
1900	3'315	2'932	383	11.6
1910	3'753	3'201	552	14.7
1920	3'880	3'478	402	10.4
1930	4'066	3'711	356	8.7
1940	4'266	4'042	224	5.2
1950	4'715	4'430	285	6.1
1960	5'429	4'844	585	10.8
1970	6'270	5'190	1'080	17.2
1980	6'366	5'421	945	14.8
1990	6'874	5'628	1'245	18.1

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland, various issues, own calculations

Tab. 5: Immigration to Switzerland[1] (in %), 1960 – 1995

Year	*Without Employment*	*With Employment*	*Total*	*Year*	*Without Employment*	*With Employment*	*Total*
1960	15.2	84.8	162'428	*1978*	54.9	45.1	57'340
1961	14.0	86.0	204'862	*1979*	51.9	48.1	60'587
1962	14.6	85.4	210'184	*1980*	50.9	49.1	75'262
1963	17.4	82.6	199'469	*1981*	51.5	48.5	87'823
1964	18.7	81.3	196'100	*1982*	50.1	49.9	83'081
1965	23.3	76.7	141'375	*1983*	52.2	47.8	65'960
1966	22.9	77.1	140'730	*1984*	50.5	49.5	66'961
1967	21.5	78.5	127'981	*1985*	49.5	50.5	68'885
1968	24.6	75.4	137'901	*1986*	49.1	50.9	76'432
1969	25.4	74.6	140'245	*1987*	46.8	53.2	81'058
1970	32.1	67.9	103'711	*1988*	47.9	52.1	86'548
1971	38.4	61.6	85'142	*1989*	46.6	53.4	92'989
1972	37.2	62.8	89'686	*1990*	46.6	53.4	117'711
1973	39.7	60.3	90'118	*1991*	50.2	49.8	126'645
1974	42.1	57.9	70'401	*1992*	56.6	43.4	128'183
1975	52.6	47.4	54'223	*1993*	61.8	38.2	117'636
1976	54.5	45.5	54'166	*1994*	61.1	38.9	103'613
1977	58.5	41.5	61'141	*1995*	65.1	34.9	94'268

Source: Swiss Federal Aliens Office (1996), own calculations

Note: [1] Immigration of foreigners holding a one-year permit or a residence permit (incl. transformations of seasonal and non-seasonal permits)

Tab. 6: Immigration cohorts and nationality groups, 1995 (in %)

Nationality Group	*Immigration Cohort (Years Since Migration)*					*Second Generation*[5]	*Foreigners Total*
	< 1	*1-5*	*5-10*	*10-15*	*> 15*		
Northern European[1]	66.8	43.1	27.0	18.7	26.4	16.0	27.4
Southern European[2]	26.2	27.3	38.6	46.7	64.3	69.1	54.5
non-European[3]	7.0	29.6	34.4	34.6	9.3	14.9	18.1
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*
Age at Immigration[4]	30	27	25	23	22	8	20
Current Age[4]	31	29	31	35	44	25	36

Source: *Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS), own calculations*
Note: [1] *Northern European: Northern European countries and other industrial countries*
[2] *Southern European: Italy, Portugal, Spain*
[3] *non-European: all other countries*
[4] *Median age*
[5] *Age at immigration less than 16*

Tab. 7: Nationality groups and immigration cohorts, 1995 (in %)

Immigration Cohort (Years since Migration)	*Nationality Groups*			*Total*
	Northern European[1]	*Southern European*[2]	*Non-European*[3]	
< 1	2.6	0.2	0.4	0.9
1 - 5	11.9	1.4	12.6	6.2
5 - 10	11.6	3.1	22.6	9.5
10 - 15	8.0	3.7	22.6	9.5
> 15	50.0	22.5	26.9	42.1
Second Generation [4]	16.0	69.1	14.9	31.8
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*
Age at Immigration [5]	26	22	24	20

Source: *SLFS, own calculations*
Note: [1] *Northern European: Northern European countries and other industrial countries*
[2] *Southern European: Italy, Portugal, Spain*
[3] *non-European: all other countries*
[4] *Age at immigration less than 16*
[5] *Median age, first generation only*

Tab. 8: Employed[1] grouped by qualification[2] and immigration cohort, 1995 (in %)

Immigration Cohort (Years since	***Educational attainment***					
	1	***2***	***3***	***4***	***5***	***6***
< 1	6.4	15.1	24.3	6.9	38.1	9.2
1 - 5	10.3	18.8	16.1	6.6	27.4	20.8
5 - 10	29.3	21.7	16.1	6.9	12.4	13.6
10 - 15	33.8	21.3	14.6	7.1	9.7	13.5
> 15	25.7	37.1	11.2	8.5	7.1	10.3
Second Generation [3]	20.6	43.8	12.7	8.2	5.0	9.8
Foreigner	26.0	30.6	13.0	7.9	10.4	12.2
Swiss	18.5	40.2	17.7	10.4	6.2	6.9

Source: SLFS, own calculations
Note: [1] Persons aged 16 to 64
[2] Educational attainment: 1=Compulsory education 2=Vocational education, 3=Upper-level secondary general education, 4=Higher vocational education, 5=University education, 6=No answer, other education
[3] Age at immigration less than 16

Tab. 9: Employed[1] grouped by qualification[2] and nationality group - men and women, 1995 (in %)

Nationality Group	***Educational attainment (Men)***						***Educational attainment (Women)***					
	1	***2***	***3***	***4***	***5***	***6***	***1***	***2***	***3***	***4***	***5***	***6***
Northern European	5.0	27.7	14.8	18.9	28.1	5.5	9.1	28.2	26.1	7.7	18.9	10.2
Southern European	33.5	36.3	9.1	6.8	2.7	11.5	43.0	28.5	11.2	1.8	1.6	14.0
non-European	18.6	27.9	10.3	7.1	16.7	19.4	29.6	26.6	17.2	4.3	3.8	18.6
Foreigner	22.7	32.3	10.9	10.3	12.5	11.4	31.4	27.7	16.6	3.9	6.9	13.5
Swiss	7.3	46.2	13.1	20.1	9.7	3.6	17.9	41.9	24.3	5.3	5.2	5.3

Source: SLFS, own calculations
Note: [1] Definition according to SLFS
[2] Educational attainment: 1=Compulsory education 2=Vocational education, 3=Upper-level secondary general education, 4=Higher vocational education, 5=University education, 6=No answer, other education

Tab. 10: Employed[1] grouped by economic sectors[2] and nationality groups 1995 (in %)

Nationality Group	*Economic sectors*								
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*
Northern	0.3	–	19.7	4.3	20.9	2.5	15.5	33.2	3.6
Southern	0.6	0.3	28.7	14.8	23.6	3.5	14.0	13.0	1.5
non-European	0.1	–	34.3	8.2	21.3	7.2	10.4	17.0	1.6
Foreigner	0.6	0.2	27.1	10.6	22.4	3.8	13.8	19.4	2.1
Swiss	5.2	0.9	17.5	6.3	19.9	6.5	16.0	22.4	5.3

Source: SLFS, own calculations
Note: [1] Definition according to SLFS
[2] Economic Sectors: 1=Agriculture, hunting and forestry, 2=Electricity, gas and water supply, mining, 3=Manufacturing, 4=Construction, 5=Wholesale and retail trade, hotel and restaurant industry, repair industry, 6=Transport, storage and communication, 7=Financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business activities, 8=Other services (health, education, research), 9=Public administration

Tab. 11: Employed[1] grouped by economic sectors[2] and immigration cohort, 1995 (in %)

Immigration	*Economic sectors*								
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*
< 1	–	–	10.4	6.6	27.9	–	5.4	37.2	12.5
1 -5	–	–	18.6	3.8	17.4	4.7	15.0	37.5	3.1
5 - 10	0.2	–	26.2	12.6	20.7	2.7	12.8	23.7	1.1
10 - 15	0.1	–	26.6	13.1	21.4	4.0	13.2	20.4	1.2
> 15	0.6	0.3	29.0	10.7	23.5	4.0	14.2	15.4	2.3
Second Generation[3]	0.3	0.3	23.7	10.0	26.2	4.7	19.7	13.4	1.8
Foreigner	0.6	0.2	27.1	10.6	22.4	3.8	13.8	19.4	2.1
Swiss	5.2	0.9	17.5	6.3	19.9	6.5	16.0	22.4	5.3

Source: SLFS, own calculations
Note: [1] Definition according to SLFS
[2] Economic Sectors: 1=Agriculture, hunting and forestry, 2=Electricity, gas and water supply, mining, 3=Manufacturing, 4=Construction, 5=Wholesale and retail trade, hotel and restaurant industry, repair industry, 6=Transport, storage and communication, 7=Financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business activities, 8=Other services (health, education, research), 9=Public administration
[3] Age at immigration less than 16

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