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**Assimilation, Cultural Pluralism and Social Exclusion
Among Ethno-Cultural Groups in Vancouver**

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Abstract: In this paper we use custom tabulations from the 1991 Census for Greater Vancouver to compare the settlement experience of immigrants with ethnic origins in Europe (the ‘traditional’ stream) and outside Europe (the ‘non-traditional’ stream). In particular we analyze the extent to which assimilation or cultural pluralism best describe the differential experience of the two groups. Assimilation is measured according to the degree to which either group moves toward the characteristics of the native-born population, while cultural pluralism is assessed from profiles of residential concentration, employment segmentation, mother-tongue retention and ethnic in-marriage. To add a dynamic component, traditional and non-traditional ethnicities are divided into three cohorts according to their length of residence in Canada. We also assess the extent to which assimilation or cultural pluralism is associated with social exclusion, that is, marginalization in terms of economic and educational achievement. Many trends emerge from the complex inter-correlations between these sets of variables. In general we find that assimilation best describes the experience of both groupings, though it is much slower for non-European immigrants and ethnicities, where cultural pluralism survives appreciably beyond the first generation. Cultural pluralism is associated with economic marginality for both groups in their first decade in Canada, though more profoundly for non-European immigrants in terms of personal income. However, labour power is substituted for human capital and household incomes among non-traditional ethnicities exceed those of European-origin groups after a decade of residence. In contrast there is some evidence that for the European-origin native-born, some ethnic separation remains and is associated with economic privilege. In general with length of residence, the relationship between variables becomes more ordered, and education emerges as a structuring effect in shaping economic outcomes. In the early years of immigration, in contrast, education has very little predictive power in terms of economic achievement.

Key words: assimilation, cultural pluralism, ethnic enclaves, economic outcomes, traditional and non-traditional immigrant groups

Introduction: Immigration, Assimilation and Multiculturalism

Debates over the immigrant settlement process in what is now Canada stretch well back into colonial times. In the strongly Anglocentric community of Toronto in the 1840s there was unease even with the landing of an apparently undue number of English immigrants (Hayward and Osborne 1973), while the arrival of several thousand victims of the Irish famine during the same decade heightened local anxieties. The Irish created the city's first large minority population, one that was economically marginalized, lived in a distinct residential environment, and that refused to adopt the dominant Protestant religion (Nicholson 1985; Cottrell 1998). Concern over this type of 'separateness' intensified in the nation-building era that followed Confederation, especially in the midst of the first mass migration to Canada that occurred between 1896 and 1913. Something close to a consensus formed around the basic principle of assimilation. Summarizing the views articulated by the social reformer J.S. Woodsworth in 1909, only those groups who were able and willing to assimilate to the language, cultural norms, and political structures of Anglo-French Canada should be admitted as immigrants; western and northern European peoples were believed to have a high potential to assimilate, eastern and southern Europeans a modest potential, and non-European peoples were thought to have no place in Canada (Woodsworth 1972).

Gradually, these widely held principles became encoded in Canada's immigration policy and remained at the core of the selection system until the 1960s. Since then, of course, they have been supplanted, first in the 1960s with the removal of the preferred/non-preferred distinction in selection and then, a few years later, by the adoption of "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework" as the official settlement policy. Initially, multiculturalism was intended to acknowledge the contribution made by non-British and non-French immigrants and their descendants to Canada, and to enable these groups to retain their cultural practices and sensibilities. This latter point is vital: multiculturalism marked an official departure from the expectation of cultural conformity, or assimilation, and instead celebrated diversity to the extent that it became a defining ingredient of Canadian identity (Day

1998). By the 1980s, another element was added to the meaning of multiculturalism: equity (Kobayashi 1993). Multiculturalism therefore came to mean two things: empowering cultural pluralism, and ensuring that people of all cultural backgrounds have equal opportunities for participation and advancement in Canadian society.

As the principle of assimilation became increasingly outmoded, the use of the term fell into disfavour. Researchers and policy makers used other terms, such as ‘acculturation’ and ‘adjustment,’ but these have largely given way to the dominant term used today, ‘integration.’ For some, of course, this is simply an issue of semantics, and they use integration as a more acceptable substitute for assimilation. But, generally speaking, the terms assimilation and integration are often portrayed as opposites, the first signifying the expectation that immigrants cast off their previous cultures and adapt to their new society, while the second is seen to imply a two-way adjustment process whereby immigrants and the host society *together* create a new culture. Critics have raised two important objections to this conceptualization. First, many believe that immigrants bear most of the burden of cultural change, and that the ‘new’ culture created by the coming together of many peoples is really not much different from the ‘old’ Anglo- and French-dominated Canada (Kobayashi 1993; also see Hage, 1998, for a similar argument set in Australia). Second, as Abu-Laban (1999) argues, the concept of integration—which is supposed to reflect the principle of multiculturalism—may actually represent a withdrawal from multiculturalism. That is, *multiculturalism* implies a society made up of many cultures with none dominant, while integration implies that, at some point, many cultures coalesce into one. Those who advocate multiculturalism, therefore, would accept the development of parallel, relatively autonomous, social groups that are, and will continue to be, different from one another in important ways. Logically, this would mean a Canada with no single cultural norm or ‘centre,’ a ‘culture’ distinguished by its diversity rather than by a set of common practices and viewpoints. Given the heightened emphasis placed on *equity* within the discourse of multiculturalism, we add that this vision now includes an expectation that all individuals, regardless of their cultural identity, should enjoy equal political and economic opportunity. In practice the

harmonization of ‘equality’ and ‘difference’ is a far from trivial undertaking (Taylor 1994, Smith 2000).

In this paper, we seek to investigate these issues empirically by a focused examination of how indicators of immigrant settlement, such as residential concentration and mother tongue use, have evolved over time, given the immense changes in immigration policy, the cultural composition of immigrants arriving in Canada, and the political/legal climate of multiculturalism. We compare the characteristics of traditional (i.e. European-origin) and non-traditional immigrants in the Greater Vancouver area.¹ We ask whether European and non-European ethnic groups, especially those associated with large numbers of new immigrants, are distinct and separate from the ‘mainstream,’ or whether they are becoming indistinguishable from it. Moreover, if there are groups that are socio-culturally apart (whether through choice or as the result of discrimination), do they face economic penalties, or is Canada developing into a society where groups are culturally different but also economically equal? Our data are drawn from custom tabulations of the 1991 Census of Canada.

Studies of Social Isolation: The Assimilationist Legacy

There is a long history of research that investigates the degree of isolation between social groups in the city, originating in the pioneering efforts of the Chicago School of urban sociology. Robert Park, his Canadian colleague, Ernest Burgess, and their many students conceptualized a tight relationship between social and physical distance. They believed that the most meaningful forms of social interaction take place in local, everyday settings, and that groups separated by distance scarcely know each other. Their work was cast in the logic of assimilation, and they asserted that the

¹ By the term ‘traditional’ we imply European origins coinciding with Canada’s historic self-recognition. We hope to broaden this study to include other major centres of immigrant reception besides Vancouver, and also to address more recent data as special tabulation of the 1996 census become available. Note that this study builds on our previous work, on the evolving geography of immigrant settlement (Hiebert 1999a) and the socio-cultural separateness and economic participation of immigrants in Greater Vancouver (Ley 1999).

level of *social assimilation* for any minority group (its economic, political, and cultural membership in American society) was matched by its degree of *spatial assimilation*, that is, its tendency to live in mixed-ethnic neighbourhoods. Peach (2000) has succinctly stated the inverse relationship between residential segregation and social assimilation

...The more residentially isolated a group, the more its interaction will be with its own members, the more its language and culture will be imprinted on new members born into the group, the more marriage will be to members of the group, the more its values will become the taken-for-granted way of doing things.

These basic ideas motivated literally decades of empirical study, first in Chicago and then elsewhere in immigrant-reception societies (for example, Duncan and Lieberson 1959; Peach 1975; Massey and Denton 1993; Hiebert 2000).

During the 1950s and 1960s statistical analysis was added to this work. Whereas the Chicago sociologists counted, mapped, and described, the postwar generation of researchers adopted statistical methods, mainly developed in the biological sciences, to ascertain, with a greater degree of precision, the *degree* of spatial distance between groups. Duncan and Duncan (1955a) advocated the use of the Index of Dissimilarity, first using it to study the degree of intermingling/isolation of occupational groups (1955b), and later ethnic groups (Duncan and Lieberson 1959). Their work was based on census data and showed that Northwestern European groups had, by 1930, distributed themselves across the neighbourhoods of Chicago. In contrast, Southern and Eastern European groups continued to be concentrated in ethnic enclaves between 1930 and 1950, though this tendency had dissipated a little over the twenty-year period. They concluded that the former groups had fully assimilated to American culture while the latter were beginning the same, inevitable, process.²

Since the 1950s, many scholars continued to use the assimilation paradigm, adjusting and refining it in various ways. For example, problems associated with

² Interestingly, they added a section on ‘The Negro’ at the end of their paper, but found it difficult to fit African-Americans into their conceptual framework—and called for additional research.

segregation indices were explored, especially the fact that they are scale-dependent. The concept of assimilation was elaborated as analysts realized that some groups adopted American culture ('behavioural assimilation') and achieved economic advancement ('structural assimilation'), while other groups remained distinct on one or both of these dimensions (Boal 1976). The fact that some groups did not readily assimilate caused researchers to question the implicit assumption that it is an inevitable process (Gordon 1964), which led to a renewed appreciation of the positive features of ethnic residential enclaves. More attention was also paid to the causes of separateness, and it was noted that oppressed groups, especially African-Americans, are isolated from mainstream White culture due to racist barriers, while other groups deliberately choose to create separate social and economic worlds (Philpott 1978). Synthesizing this interpretation, Peach (1996) reminds us that segregation can be a marginalizing *or* empowering force, depending on the circumstances.

Clark's (1998) recent work offers a state-of-the art assimilationist perspective on the changing social position of immigrant groups in California. In a comprehensive study, he examines a wide variety of dimensions—home ownership, educational attainment, income and poverty rates, English language acquisition, residential segregation, naturalization, and inter-marriage—to gauge the degree of assimilation vs. separateness of immigrant groups. After careful analysis, he concludes that Asian immigrants are joining the American mainstream more rapidly than their Latin American counterparts. Given his perspective, he finds this trend disturbing and makes a number of policy recommendations designed to accelerate the socio-economic mobility of Hispanic groups. He also speculates that emerging multicultural institutions may be impeding assimilation and, in essence, preventing people from achieving upward economic mobility.

While studies of segregation/isolation and assimilation were being refined, other scholars began to question the assumptions behind this type of research. First and foremost, they argued that by uncritically adopting census categories such as ethnic and racial classification systems, work was reproducing the invidious distinction that people can be divided into discrete races or ethnic groups that are 'naturally' different (Smith 1989). Ethnic identity at the point of immigration is being

essentialized according to this argument, permitting minorities no identity other than that of the hyphenated Canadian (cf. Bissoondath 1994). Also, segregation studies rarely consider issues of power, and tend to be written from the perspective of an imputed mainstream white society, while implying that socially/spatially isolated groups are somehow at fault (Sibley 1995). Finally, many believe, as already noted, that the expectation of assimilation is outmoded in a multicultural age, and that studies of social isolation are therefore misplaced both politically and intellectually.

While we acknowledge these criticisms, we employ, in this study, methods typically used by researchers who frame their work in an assimilationist perspective, such as segregation indices and other measures of social distance between groups. However, we do this *not* out of an expectation that assimilation is inevitable, nor perhaps even desirable, but to investigate the relationship between social isolation and socio-economic exclusion. If Canadian society embraces multiculturalism but economic penalties exist for minority groups that maintain a social distance from the mainstream, then there is an unfortunate gap between rhetoric and reality. We therefore borrow the methods rather than the purpose of assimilationist research.

A number of previous studies have examined various aspects of the variables we are concerned with here. There is a long tradition of research on Canadian ethnic residential patterns, exploring the relationship between a group's level of concentration and its institutional structure. A conclusion has been that minority groups living in close proximity are associated with elaborate socio-cultural institutions (Driedger and Church 1974). Researchers have also been preoccupied with the causes of ethnic concentration and segregation. Gradually, a consensus has emerged that these patterns reflect a combination of three factors—socio-economic differences between groups, cultural preferences, and discrimination—and that the particular interaction of these is specific to each group and urban area (Hou and Balakrishnan 1996, Ray 1998, Kazemipur and Halli 1999, 2000). Some, notably Darroch and Marston (1987), have interpreted residential concentration as a positive sign that pluralism is flourishing. This view is complicated as European groups are generally more dispersed than visible minorities (Ray 1998, Hiebert 1999a), prompting Balakrishnan and Kralt (1987) to speculate that concentration among

European ethnic groups is largely a function of preference, while non-European groups congregate in specific neighbourhoods as a response to discrimination.

Studies of the ethnic division of labour in Canada have found similar tendencies. First, there is much variation in the occupational distribution of different groups: some are spread relatively evenly across the labour market while others are clustered in a more limited range of jobs (Hiebert 1999b). Again, and with some exceptions, there is clear evidence that European groups are more likely to be in the former category while visible minorities are generally found in the latter, a pattern that is especially apparent for women (Boyd 1984; Reitz 1990; Preston and Giles 1997). Until the late 1980s, Europeans held the vast majority of occupations usually seen as more desirable—those associated with high educational requirements and better working conditions and levels of remuneration. However, as the nature of Canada's immigration system became more complex, this straightforward European/non-European dichotomy has become somewhat less clear. Studies exploring census data from the 1990s have shown that recent immigrants, mainly from non-European countries, now occupy a significant number of managerial, professional, and scientific jobs, although they continue to be disproportionately found in poorly-paid jobs as well. Given these labour market patterns, the gap in incomes between individuals of European descent and visible minorities has shrunk over the past 20 or so years, but it remains significant (Pendakur and Pendakur 1997a; Reitz 1998).

In addition to these studies of incomes among ethnic and immigrant groups, their residential location, and their labour market segmentation, researchers have investigated educational attainment (e.g., Simmons and Plaza 1998, Pendakur 2000), the degree of ethnic intermarriage (e.g., Goldstein and Segall 1985), and the language attributes (e.g., Pendakur and Pendakur 1997b; Akbari 1999; Shauf 1999) of ethnic groups in Canada. In fact, all of the dimensions of separateness vs. integration that we examine here have been analyzed in previous work. However, we are not aware of any research that has sought—as we do in this paper—to synthesize these elements, to see, for example, whether groups that are relatively isolated in space are similarly positioned in the labour market, and how these are both associated with educational

attainment, ethnic homogeneity, and household structure.³ We believe that by bringing these measures of socio-spatial distance together, and linking them with the theme of economic disadvantage, we will add an important element to an understanding of the positioning of ethnic and immigrant groups in Canadian society.

Data and Methodology

Clearly we are dealing with a complex set of relationships, and we approach them by analyzing special tabulations of 1991 census data. Most of our data are derived from a large table that provides information on individuals, 15 years of age and older, living in private households in the Vancouver Census Metropolitan Area, who specified a single ethnic origin—yielding a sample size of 180,000. We also commissioned a table at the household scale, which includes all households where the census reference person (i.e., the one who filled out the form) specified a single ethnic origin; in this case the sample size is approximately 85,500. Finally, we derived intermarriage rates from the Public Use Microdata File, and obtained a sample of just under 46,000 persons 15 years of age and older who reported one or more ethnic origins.⁴ Using all three of these sources, we compiled information on the following characteristics:

Ethnic origin: as stated, we limited the analysis to people who identified themselves as having a single ethnic origin that we could confidently assign to either European or non-European ancestry (for this reason we excluded the amorphous category “Canadian”).⁵ We included all 12 European-origin groups with at least 1,000 (single-origin) people in the sample, and all 9 non-European groups with at least 800 people.

³ Though we would note that Duncan and Lieberman (1959) undertook an impressively comprehensive analysis of assimilation and socio-economic status for a dozen minorities in Chicago in 1930 and 1950.

⁴ This figure includes multiple counts of individuals who reported more than one ethnic origin. For example, a person who indicated British and Chinese origins would appear under both categories.

⁵ Two groups do not fit this strict definition: those classified as ‘British’ in this study include people who identified a single British origin—e.g., English or Irish—or any combination of British origins; and our ‘French’ category includes people who identified themselves as single-origin French as well as those who said they were ‘French and Canadian.’

- Education: this variable is specified simply as the proportion of individuals over the age of 15 in each group that has not completed high school.
- Language: we computed the percentage of households in each group that uses one of Canada's official languages in their everyday home life. Overwhelmingly, the particular language used was English.
- Size of household: for each ethnic group, this is the average number of persons in private households.
- Residential segregation: we computed, for each ethnic group, an Index of Segregation based on the distribution of the group across the 300 census tracts of Greater Vancouver. The index ranges from a value of 0, which indicates that the group in question has exactly the same residential distribution as the rest of the population, to 100, which indicates that the group in question is completely isolated from the rest of the population. Typically, groups are considered concentrated in space when their index value reaches 30, and segregated when it is over 60.
- Occupational segmentation: we computed the same index, but this time across 57 occupations. As before, an index value of 0 means that the group in question has exactly the same occupational profile as the rest of the population, and a value of 100 would mean that the group is completely segmented into one or more occupations that it holds exclusively (i.e., it is completely separate from all other groups). Note that whenever the occupational variable is included in an analysis, only those individuals in the labour force are included, reducing the total sample size by about 30 percent.
- Ethnic homogeneity as a surrogate for ethnic in-marriage: the 1991 census questionnaire invited individuals to list as many ethnic origins as they believed relevant among their own ancestors.⁶ Most identified themselves as belonging to only one group, but a sizable minority indicated two or more origins. Those who

⁶ The actual census question was: "To which ethnic or cultural group(s) did this person's ancestors belong? Mark or specify as many as applicable."

listed multiple origins are the result, at some point in the past, of ethnic intermarriage. While we would have preferred to address the issue of intermarriage directly, we did not have the resources to do so, and instead created a surrogate index by computing the percentage of the individuals within each of the 21 ethnic groups who indicated a single ethnic origin (this would be based, for example, on the percentage of those who indicated a single origin Japanese as a share of the total number who indicated Japanese as either a single origin or as one origin among two or more). We use this variable as a very rough measure of the degree of ‘separateness’ of a group in its social interaction. It is of course defined by the degree of separateness of *previous* generations, and some groups have been in Canada much longer than others. Therefore it is strongly influenced by recency of immigration, so that a group that comes from a culturally homogeneous society and has only been in Canada for one generation would be expected to have a high ratio of ethnic in-marriage, while groups that come from ethnically mixed societies, or that have been in Canada for many generations, have a higher likelihood of including many people of mixed ancestry. Despite this important qualification, we find this measure of separateness valuable.

- Income: we use three basic measures of 1990 total income: 1) the average income for all individuals for each of the 21 ethnic groups who received some income in that year; 2) the average income of all households in each ethnic group; and 3) the proportion of the households in each group that fell below Statistics Canada’s Low Income Cutoff.

Throughout the analysis, we divide the total population into three sub-groups: non-immigrants—people who were born in Canada; immigrants who landed in Canada prior to 1981 (‘settled’ immigrants); and immigrants who arrived between 1981 and 1991 (‘recent’ immigrants).

Given our primary goal of surveying the experiences of traditional (European) and non-traditional (non-European) immigrant groups, we begin by examining the differences between these groups for all of the above variables. We then turn to a more intricate examination of the interrelationship between the variables for different

sub-groups; that is, we look at the ensemble of measures of separateness/sameness for immigrants who have arrived in the two different periods and also for the non-immigrant population.

In examining these data, we search for evidence of the various forms of settlement experience identified earlier. We expect to find evidence of assimilation when, on the one hand, immigrants are becoming like the host society and, on the other, when ethnic groups are becoming indistinguishable from each other in terms of the variables included in this study. This would mean, for example, a steady decline in the degree of residential segregation and occupational segmentation, the shrinking use of a non-official language in the home, and reduced ethnic homogeneity, when comparing recent immigrants, settled immigrants, and non-immigrants. Similarly, incomes, household size, and levels of educational attainment should be converging between the ethnic groups included here under the assumption of assimilation. We should also expect, when looking at the relationship between the variables, to find certain regularities; that is, incomes should be lowest for groups most distinct from the mainstream (those that are concentrated in certain residential areas and portions of the labour market). In this case, educational attainment should be positively associated with the use of an official language in the home as well as individual and household income, and this cluster of variables should be negatively associated with segregation/segmentation.

Given the methodology employed in this study, it will be difficult to distinguish assimilation from integration, since most of the changes enumerated above would also hold true if integration is taking place. Ascertaining the balance between assimilation and integration would require a more dynamic analysis that spanned several time periods, and that was able to reveal the degree of change in the host society as well as among groups with substantial numbers of immigrants.

The presence of multiculturalism, or pluralism, should be relatively clearly revealed by the data investigated here; it will be distinguished by the resilience of ethnic distinctiveness across the groups surveyed. In particular, we will conclude that pluralism is being maintained when we detect significant differences between

Canadian-born ethnic groups (that is, if there is substantial variation in the size of households, ethnic homogeneity, language use, and residential and occupational profiles of Canadian-born ethnic groups). However, as noted earlier, pluralism may or may not be associated with economic equity. In the former case, cultural groups remain distinct, but educational attainment and income levels converge, while in the latter there is an economic penalty for groups that remain different from the mainstream, which should be revealed in the form of lower educational attainment, lower incomes, and higher rates of poverty.

Beyond examining these broad patterns that apply to all groups, we are especially concerned with assessing the possible differences between European and non-European groups. We expect that the trajectory of assimilation/integration/pluralism may be quite different between people who, on the one hand, tend to share certain basic cultural practices with ‘mainstream’ Canadian society (e.g. Christianity and other cultural institutions) and visibly blend into the dominant white population, compared with those, on the other hand, with markedly different cultures and who are visible minorities. It is possible, for example, that traditional immigrant groups from European countries are more readily accepted by the host population and integrate with it, while non-traditional groups feel unwelcome, experience greater difficulties in the labour market, and keep apart. In the worst scenario, non-European minorities would be culturally separate and economically marginalized. We would view this outcome with some concern, for it would suggest the potential for future problems of social justice and cohesion. Ironically, it might also fit the Eurocentric predictions of early-20th century critics of immigration, such as Woodsworth, who believed that non-European peoples could not be accommodated within Canada—not, we hasten to add, because they are inferior (as he believed), but because of a biased set of opportunity structures. However, it is also possible that the situation will not be so clear-cut, and that particular ethnic groups within the broad traditional/non-traditional categories may have quite distinct settlement experiences. In this case, we would find a complex mix of assimilation/integration and pluralistic trajectories both between and within the traditional/non-traditional groupings.

Results: Assimilation, Separation and Economic Performance

I. The Total Population

We first considered the pattern of relationships for the total labour force in the Vancouver CMA falling within our population definitions in 1991 (Table 1a), before specifying sub-group analyses by place of birth and time of arrival in Canada. A tight bonding occurs among all four variables measuring facets of the socio-cultural separateness of the 21 groups—residential segregation, occupational segmentation, use of a non-official language at home, and ethnic in-marriage of parents—with correlation coefficients in the range of 0.60 to 0.85 between the variables. Joining this cluster is household size (with coefficients ranging from 0.66 to 0.84), indicating a close association between larger households and measures of ethnic separateness. A second tight cluster of intercorrelations of comparable strength binds the three income variables.

Of considerable interest is the bonding between these two clusters of income variables and the indicators of socio-cultural separateness for the 21 groups. The associations, while in the expected direction, are modest or low. Not speaking an official language at home is the best predictor of low income status, but its average correlation coefficient with the three income variables is only 0.54. In terms of the income set, household income is not accounted for by any of the four separateness variables; personal income shows modest associations, while the most robust linkages involve low-income status with an average r -value of -0.49 against the measures of ethnic separateness. Notable and unexpected is the failure of the education measure, non-completion of high school, to show a significant association with any of the other variables. This measure of human capital is remarkably isolated with negligible predictive power against income or socio-cultural separateness for the population at large.

The structure of relationships depicted in Table 1a is of course highly aggregated, with no controls on period of residence in Canada, and with all ethnic backgrounds amalgamated into a common analysis. In terms of the objective of the research to examine differences between “traditional” (i.e. European) and “non-

traditional” source regions, a first step is to divide the total population according to these geographical origins. European-origin groups, whether born in Canada or overseas, declared average incomes over \$7,000 (or 34 percent) higher than groups with non-European origins (see Appendix).⁷ Without standardizing income by time of arrival, this result is not particularly meaningful, but quite striking is the narrowing of the gap to only \$1,000 (or 2 percent) when one moves from personal to household income, a point we shall elaborate at length later.

As displayed in the Appendix, linked with European-ethnic origin was a lower average index of residential concentration than with non-European origins (27 vs. 47), a reduced level of occupational segmentation (13 vs. 21), a significantly lower incidence of non-official language use at home (3 percent vs. 60 percent) and less ethnic in-marriage, measured by the proxy of a single ethnic origin for both parents (49 percent vs. 90 percent). The strength of these last two indicators of ethnic separation, particularly for non-European minorities, is remarkable when one considers that the population includes Canadian-born and long-term immigrants as well as more recent arrivals, and clearly indicates some longevity in the maintenance of heritage cultures. It would seem as if there is a clear association between European ethnic status, low levels of ethnic separation, and higher income attainment. In contrast Canadians of non-European origin share higher levels of separation and lower incomes. However, differences in household income (as opposed to personal income) and educational attainment are quite small, though in the same direction favouring European-origin. While these comparisons suggest a vexing level of inequality, in the absence of length of residence controls they are of little theoretical value.

These relationships were examined more analytically in a second round of correlations with the data partitioned into ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ ethnic groups (Tables 1b, 1c). Associations between the variables change, in some cases substantially. Among the 12 *European-origin groups*, the intercorrelations among the

⁷ Unless otherwise indicated, all average figures presented in this paper are weighted by the population size of ethnic groups.

measures of socio-cultural separateness, while still moderate, are overall slightly lower than for the entire population, and a similar loosening of structure is evident for the income variable set (Table 1b). More substantial are shifts in relations between the two sets of variables. For European groups, there is a *positive* association between residential concentration and occupational segmentation on the one hand, and income on the other, while the association with household income strengthens markedly. In other words, among the European-origin groups, more residentially clustered and occupationally segmented ethno-cultural groups have higher household incomes, indicative of some closure among the *more* privileged. Significantly, while these relations do not extend to use of a non-official language, they do (though more weakly) indicate a positive association with the ethnic in-marriage of parents. In short, wealthier ethno-cultural groups—the clearest example of this tendency is the Jewish minority—show some separateness, in terms of occupation, segregation, and parental ethnicity, from a more open assimilationist model. In these relationships, education also plays a more conventional meritocratic role with a somewhat tighter correlation with income. These results show some convergence in other words between ethnic pluralism and economic well-being, a ringing endorsement, it would seem, of the multicultural ideal.

A somewhat different profile emerges among the nine *non-European ethnic groups* in Vancouver (Table 1c). Once again there is a considerably looser bonding among the indicators of socio-cultural separateness, though some robust linkages remain, for example between residential concentration and use of a non-official language at home. In contrast the income variables are, if anything, more tightly meshed than for the total population. The relationships between the socio-cultural and income variables return to the direction exhibited in Table 1a. The degree of residential concentration is the best predictor, with notable (negative) correlations against personal and household income and a positive value of 0.74 against low income status. But other than this significant association, there appears in general to be an uncoupling of income from socio-cultural variables for non-European groups. If the profile for European-origin groups suggested a model of socio-spatial closure for more privileged groups, there is more of a ghetto model suggested for other groups,

with residential concentration associated with low-income status. In both instances the organizing role of space as a key variable is notable. But for non-European ethnic groups, ethnic closure tends to be associated with economic exclusion.

II. Non-Immigrants

While the structure of relationships that include the total population is of considerable interest, partitioning the population by region of origin alone does not address the much longer period of residence in Canada of European-origin groups. It is necessary to standardize the analysis by grouping the population into constant time periods, and three historical cohorts were identified: the Canadian-born, immigrants landing before 1981, and recent arrivals, from 1981 to 1991.

Among non-immigrants across all 21 ethnic groups, a rich structure of relationships is sustained among and between income and socio-cultural variables (Table 2a). As before, residential segregation and occupational segmentation are tightly bonded and are both linked to personal and low-income measures, with separation negatively correlated with economic attainment. The educational variable for the first time assumes major significance, showing high correlations with each of the income variables. By the second and later generations a meritocracy seems to have arrived, with strong linkages between human capital and economic performance. Measures of non-English usage and ethnic in-marriage show weak relationships with most other variables; they are becoming marginal status effects in the meritocratic society.

Nonetheless, partitioning the population by region of origin produces some informative variations among the native-born as well as the entire population. For the *12 European-origin groups* (Table 2b), the strength of many relationships in Table 2a is weakened. The educational measure is the hub for the greatest number of moderate and strong linkages, underscoring the propulsive role of educational achievement for economic performance. Interestingly, residential concentration and occupational segmentation, are still tightly bonded ($r = 0.91$), and linked with ethnic in-marriage, while all three are negatively associated with low educational status. That is, groups

with higher average educational attainment also have higher levels of concentration in residential space, in occupational sectors, and in marital selection, indicating that these groups have attained a degree of closure in their ethno-cultural lives without sacrificing educational attainment. The income characteristics, associated with ethnic closure, however, are mixed; while household income increases with ethnic closure, personal income and the incidence of low income do not fare as well. Here the verdict on the links between ethnic pluralism and economic achievement are more ambivalent.

Among the *nine visible minority ethnic groups* born in Canada, some striking differences remain (Table 2c). First, residential concentration is the best predictor of all, with correlations above 0.50 with every other variable except ethnic in-marriage. It is now positively correlated with high school non-completion and negatively correlated with income performance; the higher the segregation level the lower the personal and household income, and the higher the incidence of low-income households. The consistency and strength of these associations indicate the significant penalty associated with residential separateness for Canadian-born visible minority groups in Vancouver in 1991. At the same time there is a clearer definition of income status: the three income variables are tightly correlated with each other and with the set of ethno-cultural indicators. High school achievement is a strong predictor of economic performance; indeed it is more important among the visible minorities than for European-origin ethnic groups. High levels of occupational segmentation, like residential segregation, predispose groups to lower incomes.

There are, then, different meanings to separateness for European- and non-European-origin groups born in Canada. For the latter, residential and occupational separation are associated with an appreciable economic penalty, but for the former occupational closure shows a slighter but positive tendency toward economic success. Educational attainment is a primary predictor of economic attainment, and even more so for visible minorities. For this population of second and subsequent generations one might expect the differentials of newcomer status would be essentially eroded. But European versus non-European differentials remain. The latter are more spatially segregated (23 vs. 44 for the index of segregation), though we need to be cautious

that the index is affected by the small population sizes of a number of non-traditional ethnic groups (see Appendix). They are also more occupationally segmented in the labour market, much more likely to have had parents who came from the same ethnic heritage (44% vs. 78%), and less likely to speak an official language at home, though this applies to only 10 percent of the population. An important personal income gap of \$5,000 (or 22 percent) remains, indicative of some barriers to personal economic advancement, although educational attainment as measured by our indicator of high school completion shows a differential of only one percent between the European- and non-European-origin groups (see Appendix). Higher levels of residential segregation and occupational segmentation penalize visible minorities, in part through their association with lower educational performance. But there is a striking departure when we examine household income. Benefiting in part from slightly larger households, the income gap is reversed when one considers household income; for non-Europeans this figure was \$58,694 in 1990, compared with \$51,217 for Europeans, an advantage of \$7500 or 15 percent for visible minorities (Appendix). Clearly the lingering signs of socio-cultural separation are not exacting an economic cost at the household level. Even use of a non-official language at home is positively associated with improved income status. But visible minority Canadians do best economically if they have escaped residential enclaves and occupational niches, and have secured at least a high school education. In other words the maintenance of some cultural pluralism, in terms of mother tongue use and ethnic in-marriage, among visible minority households born in Canada is associated not with economic marginality, but with higher household income and a smaller share of households below the poverty level, while the evidence suggests that the most successful groups have moved beyond residential and occupational concentrations. Such an optimistic profile is not sustained, however, in considering personal incomes. These results suggest selective rather than blanket realization of Canadian multiculturalism.

III. Pre-1981 Immigrant Cohort

We next turn our attention to immigrants who in 1991 had been in residence in Canada for at least 10 years. The correlation matrix for the overall population shows an abrupt simplification from the Canadian-born cohort; only seven of the 36 relationships equal or exceed a correlation of 0.50 (Table 3a), compared with 17 in Table 2a. Residential concentration, a key predictor for non-immigrants and the total population, has a substantial bond with only occupational segmentation. Use of a non-official language at home, ethnic in-marriage, and household size form a cluster of interrelated variables. A third cluster comprises the income variables, with the single substantial external linkage between personal income and non-official language use ($r = -0.60$). The education measure is detached from all others, with its strongest correlation as weak as 0.31. The structured linkages of Tables 1a and 2a have disappeared; the detachment of education from this weakly connected network of relationships suggests the absence of human capital as a major player in the structuring of relationships.

Once again partitioning the data into European and non-European origins introduces some departures from the overall trends. First, with *European origins*, we observe a strengthening of the network of relationships between each of the three clusters and the entry of the education variable as a more significant contributor (Table 3b). Non-completion of high school is linked with both personal income and use of a non-official language, identifying immigrants of European ethnicity where failure to speak English is associated with poor educational and low economic achievement. Ethnic containment in terms of mother-tongue usage introduces a significant income penalty for longer-established immigrants from Europe.

More structure is apparent among the family of variables for *non-European* immigrant groups, but the clusters and the relations between them are redefined (Table 3c). Residential concentration reassumes its central position among the socio-cultural variables as a nexus in the field of relationships, and has an average

correlation of 0.60 with the three income variables. Once more we see the economic burden associated with residential separateness for visible minorities. Occupational segmentation shows similar penalties, though in general relationships are not quite as strong. High school non-completion is no longer significantly associated with income, and there is not even consistency in the direction of associations, so that the human capital of these visible minority groups is uncoupled from their economic returns. Instead, low educational achievement's principal linkages are positive relationships with household size and use of non-official languages, from which there are substantial correlations with two of the income variables. For long-established visible minorities, then, the predictors of income are not so much educational attainment, measured through high school (non) completion, as much as measures of separation, residential segregation, followed by occupational segmentation and use of a non-official language. It is these socio-cultural measures of difference from a model of residential, occupational, and linguistic assimilation that shape, and negatively shape, economic performance. Separation implies the loss of equity.

In an important pair of relationships, household size is positively correlated with household income ($r = 0.56$), but negatively correlated with personal income ($r = -0.36$). In large households, associated with ethnic in-marriage and use of the mother tongue (though not in residential enclaves), several wage earners raise the household wage and compensate for the low personal incomes associated with limited educational achievement. These relationships suggest an interpretation that maintenance of socio-cultural pluralism in residential and occupational concentrations and use of a non-official mother tongue is associated with economic exclusion, a disappointing result for multicultural policy. Income maintenance is secured for established non-European minorities only by the additive effect of several household providers. In an intriguing substitution labour power replaces devalued educational credentials. Groups who do best economically have evaded ethno-cultural closure, a strategy that coincides with assimilation.

Systematic differences between visible-minority and European-origin immigrants survive, then, beyond the first ten years of settlement (see Appendix). Residential concentration is considerably higher for visible minorities (47 vs. 29 for

the index of segregation), but occupational segmentation is much closer to parity (21 vs. 18). The ethnic in-marriage index remains high for both groups (94 percent vs. 80 percent), and among visible minorities over half the households report the use of a non-official language at home after more than ten years' residence in Canada (58 percent vs. 10 percent). Quite clearly patterns of socio-cultural segregation remained well defined for pre-1981 immigrants in 1991, especially for those from 'non-traditional' source regions. But at the same time we see the development of an important economic indicator shared with the native-born. Non-European immigrants face a personal income shortfall of 20 percent (some \$4800) compared with European immigrants, with occupational segmentation, residential concentration, and mother tongue usage strong predictors among our variable set. The tables turn dramatically when we consider household income, for non-Europeans enjoy an income premium of \$6,300 or 12 percent and a lower incidence of households below the poverty line. An average household size more than 50 percent higher than that of European immigrants enables the collective household income for visible minorities to surge ahead, and ethnic in-marriage also exerts a favourable effect, while residential and occupational segregation once again acts as a break upon economic success. While this statistical result is perfectly compatible with long-established images of the enterprising immigrant family, it does add considerable complexity to economic analyses that typically only examine personal incomes. It suggests too that cultural pluralism is not inconsistent with economic success at the household level.

IV. The 1981-1991 Immigrant Cohort

Our analysis turns finally to the most recent immigrant cohort, those arriving in Canada between 1981 and 1991, and resident in the Vancouver CMA in 1991. The trend indicated by the passage from the native-born to the pre-1981 immigrant population is sustained with a further loosening of the pattern of relationships between variables. The ordered structure of linkages evident for the total population has virtually disappeared. The number of correlations in excess of 0.50 has fallen to only 7 for the most recent immigrant cohort (Figures 1a, 1j). This finding bears

theoretical and policy importance. The presuppositions of a meritocratic society, with the transparent linkages between education in particular and income we observed in the matrix of the Canadian-born (Table 2a), are not in evidence in this constellation of weakly related variables. In policy terms we see few significant predictors of economic achievement among recent immigrants for a set of variables that have shown persistent associations with other Canadian populations.

Among the relatively few firm relationships for the entire population of 1981-1991 immigrants, we observe the familiar bonding between segregation and occupational segmentation, with a further linkage between segregation and the surrogate for ethnic in-marriage (Table 4a). This latter correlation, however, is negative (compare the positive r -value in Tables 1a and 2a), indicating that groups with *lower* levels of in-marriage are likely to be *more* spatially segregated, an unexpected outcome. As these are also groups who do not speak an official language at home ($r = 0.73$) and have larger households ($r = 0.70$), we have the surprising finding that recent immigrant minorities that scored highly in terms of ethnic cultural retention were also more spatially dispersed in 1991.

While the three indicators of income are intercorrelated for the total population, income is a substantially isolated cluster, for although there are several correlations just below 0.50 none reaches this threshold. Close to this level are negative relationships against mother tongue use and lack of high school education. Interestingly the highest correlation in Table 4a, ($r = 0.77$), reveals a strong tie between large families and failure to complete high school. This relationship strengthens our earlier suggestion that large families are substituting labour power for human capital in reaching acceptable household incomes.

Some variation in this dissolving structure exists when we partition the population by region of origin. Among the 12 *European-born* minorities (Table 4b), the familiar close tie between residential segregation and occupational segmentation remains, but linkages outside this set are weaker. There are only weak links between personal income and the socio-cultural variables and also education. Household income has an r -value of over 0.50 only with household size (0.52) outside the

income set, though the direction as well as the magnitude of this association is informative. Although large households have gained little human capital through education ($r = 0.75$ with non-completion of high school), the combination of several hands in the labour force is able to attain higher household incomes. A striking effect of this labour power, as well as the devalued role of education, is the high *negative* correlation (-0.75) between the incidence of low-income households in a minority group and failure to complete high school.

For the nine minorities of *non-European origin* (Table 4c), associations between income variables and socio-cultural variables are muted. Household size correlates negatively with personal income (-0.54), but positively if more weakly with household income, reinforcing the suggestion already made about the importance of large numbers in households with less human capital. This relationship, then, is common to recent immigrants regardless of their origin. This distinctive response also enables visible minorities characterized by ethnic in-marriage to be associated with higher household incomes ($r = 0.57$), even though there is also a weak tendency for these minorities to include higher proportions failing to complete high school. In other words, the more culturally self-contained minorities, with substantial in-marriage and home use of non-official languages, because of their larger households do better in terms of household income. At the same time it is worth noting that while the more culturally self-contained minorities have inflated levels of high-school non-completion, the education variable has modest to low correlations with income attainment.

There are a number of surprises in a straight comparison of recent arrivals of European and non-European minorities in terms of economic and socio-cultural indicators (see Appendix). First, the two groups show almost identical indices of residential concentration (51 vs. 52) and occupational segmentation (27 vs. 26). In contrast Europeans show much lower levels of mother-tongue retention at home (25 vs. 77) and ethnic in-marriage (65 vs. 96). All income measures show a marked advantage for Europeans, with a personal income premium of almost \$8,000 or 48 percent. However, and consistent with the other cohorts, this wide differential is mitigated at the household level, where the income gap, while still large, is reduced to

\$5,600 or 15 percent. It is worth noting, nonetheless, that both income means fall below the metropolitan average in 1991. For recent European immigrants, personal incomes are over six percent below the metropolitan average of \$26,328, while for visible minorities the gap broadens substantially to only 63 percent of the mean for the Vancouver CMA. It is not possible on the basis of these data to account for the shortfall in visible minority incomes, though we should note that non-completion of high school is twice as high for recent non-European immigrants (36 percent vs. 18 percent for Europeans). Whether or not human capital explanations are adequate to account for the disparity, however, is a contested point. In addition it is certainly the case that the higher ethno-cultural closure of recent non-European immigrants (i.e., their limited assimilation) is associated with lower economic attainment. But the data do not permit us to determine whether the income penalty is driven by lower human capital, ethno-cultural closure, discrimination, or (most likely) some combination of the three.

Discussion

It is time now to draw back from the plethora of relationships in the large data sets considered above, and address the more conceptual questions raised at the outset of the paper. We are interested in asking how the results inform the discussion around immigrant settlement—specifically whether assimilation or pluralism (multiculturalism) provide the appropriate conceptual structure to account for immigrant experience through time. A second question is whether systematic variations exist for immigrants arriving from traditional European sources, who are primarily Caucasian, compared with newcomers from other sources, primarily visible minorities from outside Europe, whose numbers have expanded considerably since the passage of the 1967 Immigration Act. For now, any answers will of course be specific to Greater Vancouver.

The Appendix arrays the scores for the two populations against the full set of socio-cultural and income variables. It compares the performance of different ethnic cohorts: 1981-1991 immigrants, pre-1981 immigrants, and the Canadian-born of

second and subsequent generations, while adding the characteristics of the entire Vancouver population in 1991 as a standard. With few exceptions, the overall pattern is an assimilationist one, as values move toward the standard of the entire population.

Within this most general trend toward assimilation, however, there are substantial variations between the 12 traditional and nine non-traditional minority groups. Recent European and non-European groups begin with similar levels of residential concentration and occupational segmentation, but while European-origin levels drop rapidly and after ten years in Canada residential concentration scores are below those for the whole population, for non-European origin groups there is only a small decline on both indicators, even when we consider the Canadian-born, and values continue to exceed the overall population average. In terms of the in-marriage or ethnic homogeneity index, declines do not of course occur for either group until the second and subsequent generations, and even then significant levels of ethnic in-marriage remain, though these are much lower for European-origin minorities, with high scores continuing for visible minorities. In contrast, use of the mother tongue drops off more quickly, and has almost disappeared among the Canadian-born. Nonetheless among non-Europeans over half of residents settled for more than a decade still used neither English nor French at home. The profile here then is for a lingering pluralism in family ethnic composition beyond the first generation, although mother tongue use steadily declines, a pluralism that is more sustained among non-Europeans. An important question that cannot be answered by these data is the degree to which ethnic separateness is voluntary or in some senses imposed.

Other characteristics show little variation between traditional and non-traditional minorities after the early years of immigration. Educational performance, in terms of high school completion, converges for the two groups. This is an important outcome, for in a democracy formal education provides the human capital for economic advancement and comparable educational records would lead to the expectation of similar economic achievement. For household size, convergence occurs after the first generation, though this means a marked reduction in household numbers for visible minorities. These characteristics show a welcome tendency toward equalization.

As well as education, economic achievement is a critical test of the presence of structural equality. In line with a number of other studies, our analysis shows a marked improvement for both traditional and non-traditional groups after a decade in residence in Canada (cf. Pendakur and Pendakur 1997a; Ley and Smith 1997; Ruddick 1999). However, while personal incomes rise proportionately faster from a low initial base for longer-established visible minorities, they do not reach the level of the metropolitan average, remaining some eight percent below it even after more than ten years' residence, while personal incomes for European immigrants with the same length of residence exceed the average by 10 percent. While other factors may play a role, our correlation analysis showed lower incomes among visible minorities to be associated with occupational segmentation, residential concentration, and home use of neither English nor French, in other words, to what might be seen as the inhibiting effects of an enclave economy and culture. To this extent, then, cultural retention (one definition of multiculturalism) does not encourage economic advancement. Other interpretations, however, are possible, particularly in light of equivalent educational achievement, including systematic discrimination in the labour market (Pendakur and Pendakur 1997a; Li 1999; but cf. Wanner 1999). And while visible minorities in general have certainly received lower *personal* incomes, this picture is far from complete. Jews, victims of earlier discrimination, are at the top of the income rankings, while amongst longer-established immigrants, the Black and African group is in fifth position among the 21 ethnic minorities, while Poles are sixteenth and Ukrainians nineteenth (Ley 1999). So although a blanket charge of racism in the labour market is not persuasive, as long as visible minorities tend to find themselves in the bottom half of the personal income rankings, the question of discrimination will undoubtedly remain open.

There is a further complication in terms of economic equality. Although residential segregation and occupational segmentation in particular were frequently associated with poorer economic performance among visible minorities, among the European-origin cohort there were suggestions of the reverse relationship, with more successful groups also indicating signs of an enclave society with somewhat closed residential and occupational niches, even among the Canadian-born. It is therefore

important to remember that there is both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ segregation (cf. Peach 1996). Enclave formation need not be associated with below average economic outcomes, nor even with immigrant populations. Multiculturalism rather than assimilation may also continue for successful minorities beyond the first generation. An important caveat then becomes whether such ethno-cultural closure is also associated with exclusionary practices in the residential or labour market. Exclusionary behaviour against newcomers by established groups, though identified long ago by Max Weber, and documented by Roger Waldinger (1996) in his study of ethnic niches in the New York labour market, has not been articulated as a possible outcome of multiculturalism, where closure has only been posed as beneficial. The notion of cultural pluralism as a basis for systematic exclusion has been noted in the extreme case of apartheid in South Africa (Western 1981; cf. Massey and Denton 1993) but seems equally possible, at least in theory, in the more benign context of multiculturalism. We need to be cautious that the groups benefiting most fully from the umbrella of multiculturalism may be those who enjoy both economic success and levels of ethno-cultural closure. Such a situation would sharply raise the question of who is served by multiculturalism (cf. Hage 1998).

Most economic analysis of immigrant achievement has examined personal income, consistent with a micro-economic paradigm that privileges individual behaviour. But an important finding of this research is that results that hold at the individual scale may not apply at the level of the household. The immigrant story is inherently social; the pervasive narrative of chain migration is one dominated by the reality of the social network that binds immigrants in coping communities of kin and friends (Waldinger 1996). These informal relationships are extended institutionally in self-help voluntary organizations, including ethnic churches and other places of worship (Beattie 1998). So it is that the size of the immigrant household mitigates the tendency toward low personal incomes. Nine percent of visible minority households in Vancouver in 1991 were in large multi-family households compared with one percent for the rest of the population. Among the recent cohort of 1981-1991 immigrants, visible minority households were 40 percent larger than European households. Larger households provide an economic survival route for immigrants

who are otherwise marginalized in an English-speaking society. Their substitution of labour power for human capital brings up the level of the household wage, so that household incomes are consistently higher proportionately than personal incomes. The broad personal income gap of 48 percent compared with European-origin immigrants in the first decade after landing declines to only 15 percent in a comparison of household incomes. After more than a decade of settlement, the personal income deficit falls to 20 percent, but a dramatic turnaround takes place for household incomes, as visible minorities enjoy an income premium of \$6,300 or 12 percent. This economic achievement is carried forward into second and subsequent generations, as a personal income deficit of 22 percent among Canadian-born visible minorities becomes a household income advantage of almost 15 percent, despite the significant reduction in household size over the first generation.

This energetic involvement in the labour market by visible minorities influences also relative rates of households that fall beneath the low-income threshold. Despite an incidence of low income twice as high as the level for the whole population in the first decade of settlement, after more than ten years' residence the rate of low income households among visible minorities fell beneath both the overall rate and the rate for European-origin immigrants. This performance is consolidated in the second and subsequent generations.

The effects of this shift to a household focus are revealed in Figure 2, comparing personal and household incomes for immigrants landing before 1981 in the 21 ethnic categories (Ley 1999). In 1991 immigrants from South Asia in this cohort had an average household size of 4.4 persons. While ranking fifteenth in personal income, their household income put them in second rank behind Jewish immigrants and ahead of all other European-origin groups. Other Asian-origin groups with large households also improved their position; Koreans moved up 12 ranks, Filipinos ten ranks, Vietnamese and Chinese, seven ranks each. Southern Europeans (notably Portuguese) who also shared larger households moved up the table, while minorities from Northern and Eastern Europe, with below average household sizes, slipped back.

This reshuffling of fortunes at the household level puts a quite different spin on the often pessimistic story told of economic underachievement by recent immigrants, particularly visible minorities. Of course it is possible that various forms of welfare payment supplement the household wage, so that the effect is not simply one of achievement in the labour market. Our present data do not permit this challenge to be fully met, though in general in 1990 immigrants, including the 1980s cohort, continued to utilize unemployment insurance and social assistance at a lower level than did other Canadians (Baker and Benjamin 1995). This household strategy of recent immigrants, trading labour power for human capital, is not unique to Vancouver, nor is it specific to non-Europeans, for we have seen that the educational levels of both recent European and non-European immigrants have limited effect upon their incomes. In Montreal Rose and Villeneuve (1998: 128) have summarized several ethnographic studies “that have documented immigrants’ strategies of dual or multiple earnings...especially among immigrants of Southern European or Asian origin”. Similarly, Tang (1998: 273) has documented the high level of household income relative to personal earnings among immigrants to New York City, notably those from outside Europe. In terms of our overall thesis, then, a comparison of household incomes shows the cultural retention of visible minorities to be compatible with economic advancement. One can have multiculturalism without a socio-economic penalty.

A final point to emphasize is the evolution toward a meritocratic society through the time series. For the most recent immigrant cohort, 1981-1991 arrivals, the overall structure of relationships was weak between socio-cultural measures of separation and measures of economic and educational performance. Notable was the absence of the educational variable playing the role one expects in an advanced democratic society as a predictor of economic performance. Tables 4a-4c describe a loosely defined structure of relationships among and between socio-cultural variables and income and educational variables, including only 27 relationships where the correlation is 0.50 or higher. In the first decade of settlement this structure showed very limited contingency or mutual association among the variable set. More order enters the structure after a decade or more in Canada, so that Tables 3a-3c describing

the pre-1981 immigrant cohort include 36 pairs of variables with correlations of 0.50 or higher. The larger number of stronger links indicates a more ordered society – an integration of characteristics in a macro-sociological sense. Finally, the native-born matrices (Tables 2a-2c) evince the highest level of structure with 49 variable pairs displaying correlations of 0.50 or more and with education playing its expected role as a predictor of economic performance.

To return then to the conceptual questions with which we began: do assimilation, multiculturalism or integration best account for the empirical characteristics of immigrants in Vancouver in 1991? At the most general level the data show a progressive convergence of European and non-European origin minorities, more complete for some variables and some minorities than for others. Ethnic in-marriage has demonstrated more lasting power, and for visible minorities, so have residential concentration, occupational segmentation, and home use of the mother tongue, which appear to be associated with economic penalties, in Vancouver as elsewhere (Burnley 1998; Clark 1998). So there is evidence also of multiculturalism, although in general it has a more abiding effect for Canadians of non-European origin. But is this multiculturalism with or without structural inequality? The answer seems to be that if there is inequality it is not ubiquitous. The educational measure of high school completion shows parity between the two groupings among those resident in Canada for more than a decade. While personal incomes *are* persistently lower for visible minorities, household incomes are generally higher, and after the first decade of settlement a smaller proportion of households of non-European origin minorities than European groups fall below the low income threshold. The overall picture then is one of variable educational and economic equality, with some cultural retention that is greater in the case of visible minorities, all within a larger framework of uneven convergence over time toward a common set of cultural characteristics and residential and occupational concentration—in short a complex amalgam of assimilation and multiculturalism.

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
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Appendix: Characteristics of labour force members, by region of origin and period of immigration, Vancouver CMA, 1991

	Index of residential segregation	Index of occupational segmentation	Percent non- official home language	Pct. single ethnic origin	Average household size	Pct. non- high school completion	Average personal income	Average household income	Percent incidence of low income
Total population, 1991									
European origin	26.6	12.7	3.3	48.9	2.3	30.8	28,335	51,179	18.0
Non-European origin	46.7	21.4	59.6	90.2	3.6	34.1	21,090	50,168	24.9
Total population	32.2	15.1	14.5	56.5	2.6	31.7	26,328	50,977	19.3
Canadian born									
European origin	23.1	11.8	0.2	43.8	2.3	30.4	28,270	51,217	17.6
Non-European origin	44.2	21.5	10.4	79.1	2.5	29.4	23,220	58,694	13.5
Total population	24.5	12.4	0.6	46.4	2.3	30.3	27,943	51,507	17.4
Immigrants, pre-1981									
European origin	28.8	17.8	10.0	79.9	2.4	33.7	28,996	51,798	18.3
Non-European origin	47.3	21.3	58.3	93.6	3.8	34.6	24,207	58,137	16.9
Total population	36.3	19.4	26.1	84.4	2.9	34.1	27,032	53,913	17.8
Immigrants, 1981-91									
European origin	51.0	27.3	25.2	65.1	2.7	17.8	24,656	44,327	24.3
Non-European origin	51.8	26.1	76.8	95.5	3.8	36.4	16,665	38,689	37.4
Total population	51.7	26.3	65.3	88.6	3.5	33.5	17,920	39,943	34.5

Figures to follow

Figure 1: Inter-variable correlations, 1991












Figure 2: Ranks of personal and household income for pre-1981 immigrants in the labour force, Vancouver CMA, 1991

	Personal income (ranks)		Household income (ranks)	Mean household. size
1 Jewish	\$40,709		\$71,805 Jewish	2.3
2 British			South Asian	4.4
3 German			Chinese	3.6
4 Dutch			Filipino	3.7
5 Black & Af.			Korean	3.6
6 French	\$27,166		\$54,309 Italian	3.1
7 Norwegian			Portuguese	3.2
8 Italian			Dutch	2.7
9 Japanese			British	2.3
10 Chinese			Greek	3.3
11 Greek	\$24,440		\$50,973 German	2.3
12 Portuguese			Black & African	2.7
13 Hungarian			Japanese	2.8
14 Filipino			Vietnamese	4.1
15 South Asian			Iranian	2.9
16 Polish	\$23,150		\$44,325 French	2.1
17 Korean			Norwegian	1.9
18 Iranian			Hungarian	2.3
19 Ukrainian			Polish	2.3
20 Latin American			Latin American	3.0
21 Vietnamese	\$18,770		\$35,276 Ukrainian	2.0
European	\$28,996		\$51,798 European	2.5*
Non-European	\$24,207		\$58,137 Non-European	3.4*

Note: * indicates an unweighted average

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