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Canada's Visible Minority Population: 1967-2017

Andrew Cardozo and Ravi Pendakur

Series editor: Linda Sheldon, SFU;
Dr. Krishna Pendakur, SFU and Dr. Daniel Hiebert, UBC, Co-directors

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CANADA'S VISIBLE MINORITY POPULATION: 1967-2017

Andrew Cardozo

The Alliance of Sector Councils, Ottawa

and

Ravi Pendakur

Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

University of Ottawa

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Canada has undergone unprecedented demographic, social and economic change over the last half century. Declining fertility rates have led to an aging population, making Canada increasingly reliant on immigration for population growth. Since immigrants are increasingly coming from non-white countries, the ethnic and racial diversity of Canada is changing dramatically. Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver have been transformed into global microcosms, while mid-size cities are also noticeably becoming more diverse.

Recent demographic projections by Statistics Canada suggest that over the next decade visible minorities will represent almost a quarter of the population of Canada and almost half of the population of Toronto and Vancouver. These projections, combined with growing ethnic unrest in Europe and a litany of smaller controversies here, suggest that issues related to inclusion and exclusion should be brought to the policy foreground.

The goals of this paper are to examine the changing place of visible minorities in Canada within the context of the demographic, social, political and economic changes and to highlight the related policy initiatives which have occurred over the last four decades. The shifts in the economic foundations of the country have been profound. The post-World War II period in which Canada moved toward a more industrialized and modern society is now being replaced by a knowledge economy. In the past, the large manufacturing sector was able to offer relatively high wages, while requiring relatively low levels of schooling. The new labour force is more dichotomous both in terms of the skills required and the remuneration received. Thus workers, be they immigrant or Canadian-born (white or non-white), are increasingly entering a highly segmented labour force.

There are at least two broad implications for the place of visible minorities in Canadian society as a result of these demographic and economic shifts. On the one hand, increasing the diversity of Canada's population brings with it possibilities for new ideas and expanded trade networks. On the other hand, minorities can also be subject to explicit or implicit discrimination, which counteracts advantages they may hold.

Overall, it appears that:

- 1) Visible minorities, even those born in Canada, appear to earn less than workers belonging to the white majority. Some of the gap can be explained away by education or labour market choices such as hours of work, but a substantial portion of the gap remains even after controlling for these characteristics.
- 2) The earnings differentials faced by visible minorities are persistent. They are not based on age, and they do not disappear from one census period to another.
- 3) The gap is very different by gender. Visible minority women do not face the same magnitude of earnings discrimination as do men. However, it should be noted that this is in large part due to the fact that women are more concentrated in low wage sectors of the economy which means there is less room to discriminate.
- 4) Finally, there is also evidence to suggest that immigrants have seen their place in the labour market deteriorate, particularly through the 1990s.

In social policy terms two implications need consideration. First, the cost of discrimination and racism has a profound impact on the minorities and newcomers, creating a dichotomous society prone to large-scale inequality, exclusion and resentment. Second, large-scale immigration will invariably create

some level of disequilibrium in society, whereby "mainstream" and "new arrival" communities jockey for influence and power for defining the societal norms. To address these issues it is important to observe that governments in Canada have not ignored the implication of this demographic change. Various public policies have been developed.

The policies that were put in place over the past four decades (e.g., the Canadian Human Rights Act, the changes to immigration policy, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Employment Equity Act, and the Canadian Multiculturalism Act) represent significant public policy development meant to facilitate equality and harmony in the face of the demographic changes. The degree to which they have been appropriate or successful will always be up for debate.

One way of assessing the changing nature of Canadian society is to look at practical and real situations. These can be called the defining moments in cultural diversity. They generally have some element of decision making or controversy and have a high profile. They are defining moments because they end up defining something about our society, whether or not that is intended. Oftentimes it is a low-profile incident that ends up grabbing the headlines. Some of these "moments" may even last years or be repeated every year, but they are defining our society nevertheless.

Such defining moments include visionary public policy initiatives as described above, as well as controversies such as wearing a turban in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the debate over Islamic Sharia law for family arbitration in Ontario. The debates will continue to be emotional and passionate, but are still necessary in our evolving society.

The demographic projections of visible minority groups conducted by Statistics Canada in 2005 suggest that Canada's visible minority population will grow substantially by the year 2017. The majority of this growth will take place in Ontario and British Columbia, with specific concentration in the Toronto and Vancouver regions, and with some growth in various mid-size cities such as Edmonton, Calgary and Ottawa. It is projected that with relatively low fertility rates combined with significant immigration, the proportion of immigrants will rise steadily from 18.3 per cent in 2001 to about 22 per cent in 2017. This will be the highest proportion of immigrants in Canada since the 1920s. Given that the average visible minority population will be younger than the white population (but not younger than the Aboriginal population) and that immigrants in general will be more likely to be of working age than the Canadian-born population, Canada will be increasingly reliant on both Aboriginal and visible minority groups to fill labour force requirements, particularly in Canada's large Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs).

The projections for religious diversity are also interesting. Whereas the non-Christian groups formed 6.2 per cent of the population in Canada in 2001, they are expected to be 11.2 per cent in 2017. In Vancouver and Toronto this proportion is expected to be 14.3 per cent and 17.4 per cent respectively. The number of Muslims in Canada is projected to be some 1.8 million, while Hindus will number 709,000, Sikhs 587,200 and Jews 399,000. These kinds of numbers will bring considerable influence on the political and public policy system.

It is evident that Canadian urban centres may well be developing in two ways: cities that are growing as a result of immigration and are therefore becoming increasingly diverse and cities characterized by slower growth and a more homogenous population.

There is substantive evidence to suggest that visible minority immigrants are more likely than other immigrants to be exposed to persistent poverty. Given the general estimate of a 15 per cent proportion of the population being in persistent poverty and an immigration rate of about 225,000 newcomers a year, this translates to roughly 340,000 recent immigrants living in persistent poverty over the next decade.

This would suggest that immigrants' ability to succeed in the labour market will become more important over time. "Immigrant poverty" will remain an issue until the underlying circumstances are removed. These are generally agreed to include recognition of foreign credentials, competencies and work experience, reluctance to hire immigrants, issues of immigrant integration into the workplace and in some cases discrimination and racism. In the past integrating immigrants into the workforce has been a problem for the immigrant alone, but in today's world, where skills shortages are reaching crisis proportions, this becomes a problem for the employer as well, and as such is a problem for the Canadian economy. This change in circumstances represents the greatest hope that the issues of inequality in employment will be addressed.

While economic circumstance is important, the lightning rods for public debate will likely revolve around religious accommodation, Canadian foreign policy, and Canadian culture. As the visible minority population grows and Canada becomes even more ethnically, religiously and socially diverse, we should be prepared to continue the debate on what it means to be Canadian. But the core debate will focus on what constitutes reasonable accommodation of our new citizens and what is outside the boundaries. In this sense the commission on reasonable accommodation in Quebec (established in 2006) is particularly timely, and should be closely watched across the country.

It is important that Canadian society and governments not try to sweep these issues under the policy rug. Rather they must be faced head on, in an attempt to find common ground and accommodation. The fact that Canada is diverse today and will be even more diverse tomorrow is non-negotiable. This is fact. The projections by Statistics Canada point to a country which will be a microcosm of the world, with increasing reliance on immigration to bolster our population. Our challenge as a society is to constantly work our way through the inequalities that exist and the controversies that will undoubtedly continue to arise as we advance through the 21st century.

If the demographic trend is extended past 2017 it is clear that the non-white population will grow proportionally faster. Inter-marriage will both cause increasing diversity and offer us a bridge between cultures. This country will be as radically different in 2051 compared to 2001 as it is now compared to 1951. It is not clear to us that governments, and society at large, are spending the time and energy required to plan for such fundamental change. Perhaps it is time to think outside the box about the kinds of government structures capable of addressing issues of diversity at the federal, provincial and municipal level—all with the long term in mind.

1. INTRODUCTION

Canada's visible minority population has increased rapidly since the 1960s when immigration regulations were changed to allow substantial intake from Asia and Africa. Forty years ago, only 2 per cent of the population (about 300,000 people) could be classified as visible minority. In 2001, through a combination of immigration, births and intermarriage the census recorded 4 million visible minority persons living in Canada. The last forty years have also seen a massive move toward urbanization and rapid technological change along with growing socio-economic polarization (Myles, Morrissette and Picot 1994; see also Hawkins 1988; Myles and Satzewich 1990; Pendakur 2000).

Canada has undergone unprecedented demographic, social and economic change over the last half century. A declining fertility rate has led to an aging population, increasingly reliant on immigration to prop it up, social institutions such as the family have been transformed as single-parent and blended families become more common, and the country has become increasingly ethnically diverse through the growth of the visible minority population. Concomitantly, there have been massive social, political and economic changes during this period which have put pressure on both majority and minority populations. With changes to the composition, distribution and shape of the Canadian population have come changes to the labour force. The rise of the welfare state and consumer services combined with the decline of manufacturing has had a tremendous impact on workers because the emerging labour force is much more segmented by schooling and skill requirements.

This suggests that people are being brought to face more demographic, social and economic diversity than ever before, at a time when oncoming gen-

erations anticipate, for the first time since the 1930s, a less affluent future than their parents (Beaudry and Green 1997). The confluence of these shifts has the potential to intensify social and economic cleavages within society, particularly within ethnic groups.

Recent demographic projections by Statistics Canada suggest that visible minorities will represent almost a quarter of the population of Canada and almost half of the populations of Toronto and Vancouver. These projections combined with growing ethnic unrest in Europe have brought issues related to inclusion and exclusion to the policy foreground.

The goal of this paper is to examine the changing place of visible minorities in Canada's social, political and economic spheres within the context of the demographic and social changes as well as the policy initiatives which have occurred over the last four decades. Then, aided by population projections conducted by Statistics Canada we look at how the place of visible minorities might change over the next decade.

Our specific goal is to examine:

- The way in which immigration policy has changed since 1967 and the impact that has had on the visible minority population, and on Canadian society at large.
- Public policy responses to the changes in the diversity of the Canadian population by federal, provincial, municipal governments and school boards.
- The place of visible minorities from 1967 to the present within the economic sphere, including evidence of economic discrimination, poverty and unemployment.

- The place of visible minorities from 1967 to the present within the social and political spheres, including interaction with others, civic participation and political representation.
- Finally, using the Statistics Canada projections we will speculate about the place of visible minorities over the next decade (to 2017) within the social and political spheres.

Where possible we highlight issues related to geographic regions, gender, age and subgroups of visible minorities.

2. FOUR DECADES OF CHANGE

Canada has undergone a substantial demographic transition since the end of World War II. The population has aged, the birthrate has decreased, there has been a massive move toward urbanization, and the source of immigrants has shifted several times in response to a changing global political climate and the country's willingness to accept new peoples. The ethnic composition of the country has evolved through not only these shifts, but also through the pattern of inter-ethnic marriage which followed.

With changes to the composition, distribution and shape of the Canadian population have come changes to the labour force as the country shifted from an economy based on manufacturing to one based on service industries. In the four decades between 1961 and 2001, the number of jobs in primary industries dropped by almost 20 per cent (see Table 1). Expansion of the welfare state resulted in a tripling in the number of jobs in social services related industries (health, education and welfare). Business services increased six-fold, to constitute 16 per cent of all jobs, and the number of jobs in consumer services increased two and a half times. During the same period, the number

of jobs in manufacturing dropped from 22 per cent in 1961 to 14 per cent in 2001.

TABLE 1: INDUSTRY BREAKDOWN, CANADA, 1961 AND 2001

	1961	2001
Total	6,313,257	15,576,555
Primary industries	14.4%	4.7%
Manufacturing	22.3%	14.0%
Construction	6.8%	5.6%
Distributive services	14.1%	10.1%
Consumer services	19.6%	27.4%
Business services	5.2%	16.0%
Social services	9.9%	16.3%
Public administration	7.6%	5.8%

Source: derived from 1961 and 2001 Census published tables

The shifts in Canada's industrial profile have had a tremendous impact on workers. Forty years ago the manufacturing sector was capable of providing good jobs to people with moderate levels of schooling, but the disappearance of those jobs and the increase in skills-based industries has meant that the emerging labour force is much more segmented by schooling and skill requirements. These shifts have the potential to create or intensify social and economic cleavages within Canadian society and it is within the context of these shifts that visible minorities have been entering the Canadian labour market. The following sections describe these changes as a prelude to understanding what may happen over the next decade.

2.1 Immigration

Immigration policy in the 1960s marked a profound change in Canada's immigration intake philosophy. Where previously policy had emphasized family reunification almost exclusively, new regulations introduced by John Diefenbaker's Conservative government in 1962 also stressed skills and schooling (Pendakur 2000). The changes allowed immigration intake to rise rapidly, but in two distinct directions—skilled and sponsored—which were linked over time. As well, regulations concerning regionally based (and hence discriminatory) intake, were slowly removed, creating, for the first time in Canada, an arguably "colour free" immigration strategy. As a result, the dominant source countries slowly shifted away from Europe toward Asia for the first time.

The new regulations encouraged intake from countries where potential migrants would have access to high levels of schooling, and where extended families were the norm. This meant that the first wave of immigrants would be highly skilled, and that there was an almost guaranteed second wave of sponsored relatives who were not selected on the basis of skill requirements.

The regulatory changes had their effect. Immigration levels were relatively low compared to the previous decade. Intake in 1961, for example, was the lowest it had been since 1947, a time when there were similar changes occurring to immigration regulations and procedures. While intake was only seventy-one thousand in 1961, it tripled to just short of two hundred twenty-thousand by 1966 (see Figure 1). The mix of source countries also changed, for although sponsored immigration continued, the new regulations allowed increased (and skilled) immigration from outside Europe. Thus, immigration from Asia gradually increased through the 1960s from about two thousand

in 1961, to twenty-three thousand by 1970, and then up to fifty thousand by 1974. By 1971, although the size of the immigrant population had increased only marginally from 2.8 to 3.3 million persons, there had been some real changes in the composition of immigrant groups. Now, immigrant groups from South Asia, the West Indies and China were counted among the fifteen largest groups. As well, there were an additional one hundred thousand immigrants from Italy and the Greek immigrant population had doubled to almost eighty thousand persons over the course of the ten year period.

What followed was 25 years of regulatory entrenchment. There were a number of special measures which influenced the way in which immigration intake was handled, but these measures did not greatly affect the direction immigration intake was going. The Adjustment of Status Program (1973), for example, which ended the practice of allowing immigrants to apply for landed status, closed a loophole but did not significantly change the type of intake. Even the passage of the 1974 Immigration Act (in 1978) only ratified regulations which had been in force for a decade.

Immigration from Southern Europe, which was primarily sponsored, remained constant through most of the period but started to decline by the early 1970s. Immigration from Italy reached a high of thirty-one thousand in 1966, but then fell to only forty-five hundred by 1976. In the same way, while immigration from the UK remained relatively high, there was a slow decline from the mid-1960s through to 1977. Where one-third of all immigrants came from the UK in 1966, this was true of only one in seven by 1976 (Manpower and Immigration 1960–1977).

The intake pattern for European countries followed a rise and fall, but was primarily based on sponsored intake. As the supply of sponsored immigrants

ran dry, so did the intake from a particular country. Intake from Asia and outside Europe rose however, because the new regulations allowed in a new supply of skilled entrants who established roots in Canada and then called for their relatives. In this sense, the pattern for Asians was similar to that of Italian immigration a decade earlier when changes to regulations had allowed a broader range of relatives, thereby encouraging immigration from Southern Europe.

By 1981, immigrant groups from Hong Kong, the Philippines, Jamaica and South Asia all ranked among the largest groups. The 1970s and 1980s also saw substantial increases in the proportion and volume of immigrants admitted under either humanitarian or compassionate grounds (refugees). Twenty years later, China, India, Hong Kong, and the Philippines ranked among the top ten countries of origin for immigrants.

2.2 The Impact on Canada's population composition

A half century of immigration intake and intermarriage has served to shape Canada's population. By way of example, in 1941 half of Canada's population reported British as ethnic origin, and 30 per cent reported French (see Figure 2). Only one in five persons reported an origin other than British or French. Twenty years later, in 1961, as a result of substantial intake from Southern Europe, one quarter of the population (26 per cent) reported origins other than British or French. In 2001, 47 per cent of the population reported at least one origin other than British or French (see Figure 3).

The nature of the population reporting other origins has also changed. In 1941, of the ten most frequently reported ethnic origins other than British or French, only persons of Aboriginal origin were from outside Europe (see Figure 4). By 1961, Southern European groups were becoming more dominant

and Italian was the third most frequently reported minority ethnic group. The German population had increased dramatically to almost a million and there were almost 430,000 persons reporting Dutch origins.

Two decades later, in 1981, there were almost 300,000 persons with Chinese origins, and 200,000 persons with South Asian origins. In 2001, over 1 million people reported Chinese and almost 1 million reported a South Asian origin. Over 300,000 people reported Filipino as an origin (see Figure 5).

With increasing diversity has come increasing urbanization. Recall that prior to World War II, Canada was far more rurally based and immigrant intake was far more likely to be focused on rural development. The postwar period saw a move to Canada's large urban centres by both Canadian-born and immigrant residents. As a result, Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver have been transformed into world microcosms through a combination of past and present intake patterns. What is perhaps more telling is the fact that each urban area has its own ethnic mix. In 2001, the largest ethnic groups were Italian in Montreal, South Asian in Toronto and Chinese in Vancouver. The second largest group in Toronto was Chinese, in Montreal, Jewish and in Vancouver, German. Visible minorities in particular are concentrated in Canada's large urban centres with 43 per cent of Canada's total living in Toronto, and 18 per cent in Vancouver.

2.3 Changes to the labour force

With changes to the composition, distribution and shape of the Canadian population came changes to the labour force. The postwar period was a time in which Canada moved towards a more industrialized and modern society. In 1961, Canada's urban industrial profile was centered on manufacturing and consumer services. Over 40 per cent of all workers were employed in

these two industrial sectors, with almost one-quarter in manufacturing alone. Primary sector industries employed almost one in seven workers, and social services almost one in ten.

Forty years later, the shape of the labour market had changed radically. The manufacturing sector has dropped to about 14 per cent of all workers. The service sectors have grown dramatically. Over one-quarter of workers (4.3 million people) are employed in the consumer services sector. Business services, which employed only 5 per cent of the workforce in 1961, employed 16 per cent of workers in 2001. The expansion of the welfare state, which took place during the 1960s and 1970s, has meant that the number of jobs in social services related industries (health, education and welfare) increased almost five times by 2001 and went from 10 to 16 per cent of all jobs (see Table 1). What is also apparent is that men and women enter the labour force in very different ways. In 2001, 18 per cent of working men were in the manufacturing sector and almost one-quarter worked in consumer services. Only 9 per cent of women worked in manufacturing, but almost one-third worked in consumer services and almost one-quarter in social services.

The changes in the industrial profile of the country had a tremendous impact on the skills and educational requirements for the labour force. In the past, the large manufacturing sector was able to offer relatively high wages, while requiring relatively low levels of schooling. The new labour force is more dichotomous both in terms of the skills required and the remuneration received (Myles and Fawcett 1990). Emerging occupations in the health, education and welfare sectors, as well as those in business services, tended to require far higher levels of schooling than was the case for other sectors. New jobs in consumer services tended to require relatively low levels of both skill and education. The manufacturing sector was stagnating, while new jobs in

the services sectors were at both the high and low ends of the wage-education spectrum. While low skill-high wage jobs were prevalent during the 1950s and 1960s, these jobs were fast disappearing through the 1970s and 1980s. Thus workers are increasingly entering a highly segmented labour force.

3. PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSES

The changes and shifts in Canada's demographic, social and economic domains have not gone unnoticed by the government. In recognition of, and in response to both the shifts and the interaction across domains in Canada, federal and provincial governments have introduced a variety of legislation and policy over the years aimed specifically at issues of diversity. Primary among them are the Bill of Rights, the Multiculturalism Policy and Act, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The following section provides an overview of these policy initiatives within the context of the demographic and social shifts faced by Canada.

3.1 The Bill of Rights

The first postwar bill to recognize the diversity of Canada's population in a major way was the Canadian Bill of Rights, passed in 1960 by the government of John Diefenbaker. It was the first legislation to recognize human rights within the context of diversity:

It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely,

(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law;

(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the law;

(c) freedom of religion;

(d) freedom of speech;

(e) freedom of assembly and association; and

(f) freedom of the press.

(Bill of Rights 1960; Parliament of Canada)

The Bill had the status of a regular law rather than constitutional authority¹. It was thus more limited in scope than the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms passed in 1982. However, its impact on the immigrant population was enormous. The Bill of Rights paved the way toward removal of barriers to immigration by non-Europeans. As detailed previously, prior to 1960 immigration from Asia, Africa and Central America was extremely limited. With the passage of the Bill, removal of immigration regulations restricting access of non-Europeans was inevitable. On January 10, 1962, Ellen Fairclough outlined for the Prime Minister an immigration intake system stressing, in large part, selection based on skills and qualifications (Citizenship and Immigration 1962). Sponsorship was maintained, but extended relatives would now be required to demonstrate they possessed necessary skills. All references to race or region were deleted from the selection criteria. Twenty-two days later the proposed system was law.

¹ The Canadian Bill of Rights is not a regular law. It is a quasi-constitutional law which has the legal power to quash any federal laws that go against its dispositions—see Joseph E. Magnet's *Constitutional Law of Canada*, 8th ed., Part VI, Chapter I.

3.2 *The Multiculturalism Policy*

One of the primary initiatives was the formation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism established by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson in 1962.

As the Royal Commission went across the country it heard, most notably in the Prairie provinces, that biculturalism did not reflect the fullness of Canadian society. Interveners of Ukrainian, German and Polish origin were vociferous in saying there was a more diverse country than represented in the bicultural formulation. They were not opposed to the idea of two official languages for Canada. Rather, they wanted the state to recognize the importance of maintaining ethnic and linguistic diversity along with bilingualism.

Book IV of the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission report, released in 1967 was called *The contribution of the other ethnic groups*. It described the positions put forward for a more diverse viewpoint and recommended measures to be taken to safeguard that contribution.

In response to the report, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced the Multiculturalism Policy in the House of Commons on October 8, 1971.²

The policy that Trudeau outlined had four major components:

to assist "all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada",

- to assist "all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society",
- to promote interaction among all groups "in the interest of national unity",
- and

² Despite the rhetoric, the policy was not backed up by legislation. The Multiculturalism Act was not passed until 1988, 17 years later.

- to assist immigrants to learn French or English "in order to become full participants in Canadian society".

While strongly endorsing the policy announcement the opposition leaders had some reservations. Robert Stanfield had three misgivings. First, that it had taken the government a long while to respond to this aspect of the Royal Commission report. Second, that the Liberal government had rejected an amendment to the Official Languages Bill when it was being debated in 1969 which would have endorsed the right to speak other languages and preserve other cultures. Third, that there were no funds attached to this policy which noted that financial support would be provided "resources permitting."

David Lewis said he would forgo comments on the tardiness of the policy and in endorsing the new policy said it was the "failure" of all Canadians not to have made progress on this policy earlier. He said all parties needed to ensure that adequate funds were provided to ensure that the principles were put into practice.

Réal Caouette endorsed the idea that Canada has two official languages and a multiplicity of cultures, although he took issue with Mr. Trudeau's words "for although there are two official languages, there is no official culture." Representing a Quebec-based party, he said that he wanted to see a Canada for all ethnic groups and he viewed this as the best way to achieve national unity.

Their use of terminology is interesting. By using the term "other ethnic groups," they recognize that the English and French do constitute ethnic groups too, but reinforce a status of "otherness" to the non-British and non-French groups. The former point seemed to dissipate over the years, so that the term

“ethnic groups” was only to apply to “the others,” and multiculturalism was to become a policy primarily for the others only.

Despite the four principles encompassed in the policy statement, in its first iteration the focus of the policy tended to be on the recognition of various cultures and on the affirmation that there was a legitimate place for them to exist with pride in Canada. This had the multiculturalism minister attending an endless slew of events hosted by myriad ethnocultural organizations. Most of the grants—albeit in small amounts—were aimed at cultural development. The major focus was on cultural retention by these groups which for many also included linguistic retention or what came to be known as the “heritage languages.” Critics called this a “song and dance policy.”

The idea of a multiculturalism policy within a bilingual framework also made two subtle points. The first was that the bilingualism formation was the larger or dominant formation within which the multicultural one existed. More subtle was that the multicultural policy also existed within the Canadian identity. It was not clear whether one’s “Canadianness” was to be dominant over one’s origin, or whether you could be Canadian and be something else, on an equal footing, or further along this continuum, whether you could be that something else first and foremost, while being Canadian was a secondary matter, only a matter of a passport or place of residency

Some months after the announcement of the policy, Trudeau appointed the first minister to be known as the Minister of State for Multiculturalism— in other words a junior minister whose departmental support was a “program” within the much larger Secretary of State Department. Through the seventies, this program got a small budget which gradually grew, but never rivalled any federal departments’ in size.

While the 1971 policy has often been dismissed as amorphous and out of date, if one reads it closely and takes into account the changing nature of terminology, the four components really speak to four principles that are very much active in today's policy arena:

- advancement of the diversity of cultures to enrich Canadian culture and identity;
- advancement of equality and combating of racism;
- promoting intercultural understanding and;
- full and equal integration of immigrants.

Thus the ideals of the Multiculturalism Policy remain politically and socially defensible even three and a half decades later.

3.3 The Canadian Human Rights Act and the Commission

It is appropriate to keep in mind that the multiculturalism policy has always existed within the context of a suite of laws and policies. In 1977 Parliament passed the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA), the purpose of which is:

“to extend the laws in Canada to give effect, within the purview of matters coming within the legislative authority of Parliament, to the principle that all individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their needs accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex...” (Justice Canada 1977).

The Act also established the Canadian Human Rights Commission as a body to receive, investigate and settle complaints as well as carry out various means to encourage practices that respect the human rights of Canadians. The Act applies only to federal jurisdiction, and does not deal with issues within provincial jurisdiction or the private and non-governmental sector.

The CHRA represents a major step towards equality in Canadian society. Its focus on discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin,

colour, religion are the key tenets of diversity captured subsequently in both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. It is worth noting however that the province of Ontario's Human Rights Code preceded the act by 15 years.

3.4 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

The Charter of Rights, entrenched in the Canadian Constitution in 1982, has at least three clauses that relate closely to multiculturalism, diversity and equality. Freedom of religion is addressed in section 2 of the Charter. This clause has received greater attention over the last two decades, and especially over the last decade as the number of Canadian citizens from non-Christian religions increase.

2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
 - a) freedom of conscience and religion;

Equality Rights are addressed in section 15, with subsection 15(1) setting out the rights, and subsection 15(2) allowing for corrective measures such as affirmative action. This section came into effect in 1985.³

15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

The Supreme Court of Canada has stated on several occasions that the purpose of section 15 is to protect those groups who suffer social, political and

³ It is important to note that the Supreme Court of Canada has stated in several occasions that the purpose of section 15 of the Charter is to protect those groups who suffer social, political and legal disadvantage in society. In addition, subsection 15(2) allows for certain laws or programs that promote the inclusion of disadvantaged individuals or groups in our society.

legal disadvantage in society. In addition, subsection 15(2) allows for certain laws or programs that promote the inclusion of disadvantaged individuals or groups in our society.

Ethnocultural organizations fought tenaciously for the multiculturalism clause between the first and final draft of the Charter. The clause requires that the entire Charter be interpreted in light of it. Interestingly, it was added along with section 25 which provides similar guidance in terms of gender equality.

27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.
(Justice Canada 1982).

Section 1 of the Charter is also an interpretive clause which says that the Charter shall be interpreted in a manner "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Together with the three clauses listed here and those dealing with official languages and Aboriginal rights, the Charter sets rights and freedoms in a diverse society in a clear and succinct manner, and also provides a vision about the society we live in and aspire to have. The rights addressed and the vision it provides has made the Charter a visionary statement.

3.5 Multiculturalism Policy developments

Towards the end of the seventies and early eighties, policy initiatives began to move into issues of equality. There were a few racial incidents in places such as Toronto and people were beginning to think that the multiculturalism policy needed to respond. This shift began with policy announcements by the multiculturalism minister of the time that would address more social policy issues, including race relations and the inequality faced by immigrant women. During this period the government also established two commissions that were at work in the early 1980s.

3.5.1 The Equality Now! report

The first commission was the "Special Committee on Visible Minorities in Canadian Society" established in June of 1983. Interestingly, while the multiculturalism minister had wanted to use the term "racism" or some derivative of it in the title of this review, his cabinet colleagues wanted to use a milder term, hence the long title. The *Toronto Sun*, nevertheless, got the point. The day after the committee was announced, the *Toronto Sun's* headline read: "Feds call enquiry on Racism," with the last word in big letters.

The full title did have some benefits in that it caused the committee to look into the socio-economic status of visible minorities, resulting in a more in-depth look at racism and some more comprehensive recommendations.

Following several months of hearings and deliberations the groundbreaking report of the committee was tabled in Parliament in March of 1984 and entitled *Equality Now!* The main themes of the report were social integration, employment, public policy, justice, media and education. Some of the specific recommendations called for:

- a Multiculturalism Act and new Multiculturalism Ministry (department)
- better official language classes for new arrivals
- programs for immigrant women
- affirmative action for visible minorities in the public and private sectors
- introduction of hate crime laws
- strengthening of the Canadian Human Rights Commission
- the Canadian broadcasting policy to address diversity

- the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to do more to reflect racial diversity
- means to help the education system address issues such as racial harassment and intercultural understanding

(Canada 1984).

3.5.2 The Employment Equity Act

The "Royal Commission on Equality in Employment," headed by Rosalie Abella, looked at the status of visible minorities as well as women, persons with disabilities, and Aboriginal peoples. Its conclusion was that there needed to be a holistic "employment equity" program rather than a numbers-based affirmative action styled program, which she acknowledged had gathered a fair amount of negative opposition.

Abella completed her report over the summer of 1984, in time for it to be delivered to the new Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney. Flora MacDonald, newly appointed Minister of Employment and Immigration, was tasked with putting together the response to the commission. MacDonald accepted Abella's recommendations in large part and introduced legislation which led to the Employment Equity Act being passed by Parliament in 1986.

3.5.3 The Canadian Multiculturalism Act

Following the release of the *Equality Now!* report, the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau introduced a Multiculturalism Bill in the House of Commons in the summer of 1984. While the bill was not passed by the subsequent (short-lived) Liberal government of John Turner, it served to lay the groundwork for such an act.

In the federal election of 1984, all three political parties promised to introduce and pass such legislation. The Mulroney government had four different ministers responsible for multiculturalism in its first mandate and each minister set out to consult with various people about how this legislation should be crafted. Finally a bill was introduced in 1987 and passed in 1988. While it was amended considerably during its passage through Parliament, it had substantial support among ethnocultural organizations and was unanimously passed in the House of Commons. This unanimity is worth noting, as it is not clear that it would enjoy the same status today.

The Act outlined the new policy as follows:

3. (1) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government of Canada to
 - (a) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage;
 - (b) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism is a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity and that it provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada's future;
 - (c) promote the full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of all aspects of Canadian society and assist them in the elimination of any barrier to that participation;
 - (d) recognize the existence of communities whose members share a common origin and their historic contribution to Canadian society, and enhance their development;
 - (e) ensure that all individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity;
 - (f) encourage and assist the social, cultural, economic and political institutions of Canada to be both respectful and inclusive of Canada's multicultural character;
 - (g) promote the understanding and creativity that arise from the interaction between individuals and communities of different origins;
 - (h) foster the recognition and appreciation of the diverse cultures of Canadian society and promote the reflection and the evolving expressions of those

cultures;

- (i) preserve and enhance the use of languages other than English and French, while strengthening the status and use of the official languages of Canada; and
 - (j) advance multiculturalism throughout Canada in harmony with the national commitment to the official languages of Canada.
- (Canada 1988).

The Act acknowledged multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society with an integral role in the decision-making process of the federal government. It also focused on the eradication of racism and removal of discriminatory barriers as being incompatible with Canada's commitment to human rights. Its policy goals were social justice, identity and participation. The above can be summarized as follows:

- pursue equitable employment practices;
- support civic participation;
- promote cross-cultural understanding;
- collect statistical data on Canadian diversity;
- make use of employee language skills and cultural knowledge; and
- generally act in a manner that is sensitive and responsive to the multicultural reality of Canada.

The ten policy objectives set out above, which are still in effect today, are all based on a gentle call to improve along certain lines: to recognize, to promote, to encourage, to foster, to preserve and to advance. Only one objective is a clear directive from Parliament, which commits the government to "*ensure* that all individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity" (emphasis added). To a large

extent this objective is the essence of the Canadian Human Rights Act and therefore does not represent any new commitment by government.

- The new aspects of the multiculturalism policy brought in by the Act were:
- a set of policy objectives that both guide the policy and require regular reporting,
- that the Act requires all departments and agencies of Parliament to implement multiculturalism as it applies to their particular mandate, and requires them to report on progress,
- that an annual report is tabled before Parliament on how the Act is being
- implemented across all departments and agencies of the federal government.

3.6 Provincial policies

Provinces have dealt with multiculturalism in a variety of ways, usually reflecting the particular diversity and history of the province. The issues that have come up at the provincial level have addressed such things as integration of newcomers, police-community relations, immigration and anti-racism issues in the school system and in social services.

Legislation has directly or indirectly addressed diversity in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia. Major initiatives include:

- British Columbia: *Multiculturalism Act* (1993)
- Alberta: *Cultural Heritage Act* (1984), *Alberta Multiculturalism Act* (1990), and the *Human Rights Act, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act* (1996)
- Saskatchewan: *Saskatchewan Multiculturalism Act* (1974, revised in 1997)

- Manitoba: *Manitoba Intercultural Act* (1984)
- Ontario: *Ministry of Citizenship and Culture Act* (1982)
- Quebec: *Loi sur le Conseil des relations interculturelles* (1984), and *Loi sur le ministère de l'Immigration et des Communautés culturelles* (2005)
- New Brunswick: *Policy on Multiculturalism* (1986) (not legislation)
- Nova Scotia: *An Act to Preserve and Promote Multiculturalism* (1989)
- Prince Edward Island: *Provincial Multiculturalism Policy* (1988) (not legislation)
- Newfoundland and Labrador: *An Immigration Strategy for Newfoundland and Labrador* (2005) (not legislation)

3.7 Summary

The policies reviewed in this section aim to advance equality for all and facilitate harmony in society. At the very least such policies provide a vision and a framework, and in so doing, reflect a societal norm. Some are prescriptive and proactive, such as employment equity, while others are primarily guarantors of certain rights for which citizens have to go to the courts to have such rights affirmed. While there is probably less need for new policies now, there is a need for better implemented policies with greater financial resources and demonstrated political commitment.

4. IMPLICATIONS

What are the implications of these demographic and economic shifts given Canada's increasing visible minority population? On the one hand, basic human capital theory suggests that increasing the diversity of Canada's population should also increase opportunities by expanding trade and commerce networks. This is because minorities with background in other countries can often act in more than one labour market. Minorities can also expand the available pool of contacts by adding people who may not be readily accessible to the mainstream population. The ability, for example, to work within an ethnic enclave within Canada or access networks in another country can increase

transactions, trade opportunities and the overall level of productivity. Thus, minorities are often viewed as bringing with them advantages associated with specialized skill sets and contacts which can result in increased productivity.

On the other hand, minorities can also be subject to explicit or implicit discrimination which counteracts advantages they may hold (Kelley and McAllister 1984, 400; see also Evans and Kelly 1991, 1986). Some of these issues are directly related to loss of human capital. Non-recognition of foreign credentials and foreign work experience can result in a net loss of productivity both at a societal and individual level (Hawthorne 2007). Other issues are distributional. If jobs are rationed so that minority groups do not have access to the same types of jobs as majority members, the result can be earnings disparity (see Hodson and Kaufman 1982; Boswell 1986). Viewed within the context of Canada's shift away from manufacturing and toward a service- and knowledge-based economy, it is important to determine the degree to which minorities may be excluded from the high paying "knowledge jobs." Finally, some issues are related to the degree to which minorities are subject to different forms of labour force discrimination.

4.1 Loss of human capital

The loss of human capital faced by immigrants can take a number of forms. Primary among these are the loss of networks and recognized academic credentials (see McDade 1988; see also Basran and Zong 1997). This aspect of credentials is often ignored within the brain-drain debate, for although Canada does receive a large number of skilled immigrants each year, the degree to which their skills are recognized is debatable. The inability to have academic credentials recognized is most apparent among immigrants who enter Canada

as adults (those who enter Canada as children generally gain Canadian credentials). As well, the act of migrating means that many immigrants lose the set of contacts and networks necessary to find work. Within this context, ethnic work-enclaves may act as a refuge for immigrants because within such enclaves the contacts and foreign credentials are more likely to be recognized and valued (see for example Li, 1992).

There is some evidence to suggest that the importance of non-recognition of credentials is overstated. Pendakur and Pendakur (1998) compared the earnings of immigrants who got their final degree in Canada to those who obtained their final degree outside Canada. They found that the earnings of the two groups were basically the same, suggesting that it is ethnicity and immigrant status which explains the difference in earnings rather than the non-recognition of credentials. Abou-Najm (2001) concluded that foreign credentials only mattered for occupations that are controlled by professional organizations (engineering, medicine, etc.). In other cases (for example, social sciences or arts), while both groups faced an earnings penalty, there was no significant difference between the earnings of immigrants educated in Canada and those with foreign credentials. Once again, this suggests that it is the immigrant status and ethnicity that explains earnings differentials rather than place of schooling.

4.2 Distribution across the labour market

Is there evidence that minorities are concentrated in different sectors of the labour market as compared to Canadian-born workers? Split or dual or segmented labour market theories were developed in the United States to explain the economic sources of discrimination. Eric Wright, for example, has looked at whether income inequality between American blacks and whites is

a product of race or class (the distribution of jobs) (Wright, 1978). His work suggests that it is a product of class, in that blacks are more likely to be in the working class than whites, thus their wages are more likely to be lower. The same question could be asked about differences in income between minority and majority members of society.

Certainly, there is some evidence of concentration. Hiebert and Pendakur (2003) looked at industry concentration within the context of self-employment, concluding that immigrants were overrepresented. Self-employment may be seen in part as a means of seeking upward mobility which may have been denied within the employed sector. Pendakur (2000) looked at industry concentrations, comparing immigrants to Canadian-born workers and concluded that there is some streaming of immigrants into lower wage sectors if they are not schooled in Canada. However, immigrants who are schooled in Canada have industry distribution profiles very similar to those of the Canadian-born population (see also Mata and Pendakur 1999).

To a large degree, then, the issue for visible minorities may be less about distribution and more about unequal wages or inability to get work.

4.3 Discrimination

There has been some debate whether Canada's visible minority population is subject to discrimination in the labour force. Wanner (1998), for example, argues that after controlling for human capital endowments, visible minorities do not face a wage gap in comparison to Canadian-born whites. These findings are reiterated by daSilva and Dougherty (1996), Hum and Simpson (1998), and daSilva (1992). Baker and Benjamin (1997) and Pendakur and Pendakur (1998a), however, who look at salary differences at the level of the CMA, find that visible minority men born in Canada face a wage penalty of about 8

per cent in comparison to Canadian-born whites after controlling for endowments (see also Zian and Mathews 1998). These studies have used either the public census files (from 1986 or 1991) or the *Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics* and are to varying degrees hampered by small sample sizes, particularly when looking at visible minorities born in Canada.

Pendakur and Pendakur (2000, 2007b) argue that to answer questions related to discrimination, the born-in-Canada visible minority population is very important. This is because earnings differentials faced by visible minority immigrants can be explained in terms of understandable characteristics not necessarily related to discrimination such as language ability, non-recognition of credentials, loss of networks, etc. Hiebert (2006) argues that language ability is the prime determinant of differential employment outcomes. Although not necessarily just, earnings differentials based on these criteria are not the same as those based on discrimination. These rationales for earnings differentials cannot be attributed to visible minorities born in Canada who are educated and socialized here (see Kustec et al. 2007). Thus, if Canadian-born visible minorities face a labour market disadvantage relative to whites, this constitutes strong evidence that the labour market does not treat visible minorities fairly.

Figure 6 (drawn from Pendakur and Pendakur 2007b) shows results from regressions that measure earnings disparity between Canadian-born visible minority and white men and women for the period 1970–2000. These data are drawn from the 20 per cent sample of the censuses (rather than the public use files). Sample size is therefore not an issue. The regressions control for age, education level, city of residence and family type. The regression results shown in figure 6 suggest that in 1970, visible minority women earned almost 10 per cent more than did similarly aged and educated white women living in

the same cities and the same types of households. However, visible minority men earned about 5 per cent less than did white men with similar personal characteristics. From 1970 to 1990, the gap for men remained fairly stable, but the gap increased dramatically through the early 1990s (Pendakur and Pendakur 2002a). These results pertain only to the Canadian-born population and are thus not driven by (first-generation) immigration effects. In 1995, Canadian-born visible minority men earned about 15 per cent less than similarly aged and educated Canadian-born white men (Pendakur and Pendakur 2002a). The pattern for women is quite different: the relative earnings of visible minority women fell throughout the period 1970 to 1995 (from +0.10 to -0.04). It should be noted that there was some improvement in the late 1990s. Between 1995 and 2000, the earnings differential faced by visible minority women shrank from 6 to 4 per cent and for visible minority men it shrank marginally from 15 to 13 per cent (Pendakur and Pendakur 2007). Including work characteristics decreases the gap to 8 per cent which means that about half the gap is a product of minorities not being in the same types of jobs as majority workers. If this is because relatively good jobs are being rationed, the gap could be evidence of a segmented labour market and a more institutionalized form of discrimination.

4.4 Disparity across cities

Because each city can be thought of as a separate labour market with its own ethnic makeup, Pendakur and Pendakur (2002a) estimated the earnings gaps facing Canadian-born visible minorities compared to Canadian-born whites in ten CMAs (see Table 2).⁴

⁴ The figures in Table 2 are drawn from regressions in which the dependent variable is the log of earnings. Independent variables include age, education, marital status and household composition. Separate regressions were run for each CMA.

TABLE 2: EARNINGS DISPARITY BY CMA, 1996

	Females		Males	
	coef	sig	coef	sig
Halifax	-0.14	**	-0.24	***
Montreal	-0.19	***	-0.21	***
Ottawa-Hull	-0.15	***	-0.08	*
Toronto	-0.12	***	-0.17	***
Hamilton	-0.13	*	-0.1	
Winnipeg	-0.12	*	-0.16	***
Calgary	0.02		-0.18	***
Edmonton	-0.04		-0.16	***
Vancouver	0.1	***	-0.06	***
Victoria	0.03		0.05	

Significance: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

For women, earnings disparity is greatest in the central and eastern cities, with earnings differentials ranging from 12 to 19 per cent. Earnings disparity is close to zero in Calgary and Edmonton, and in Vancouver visible minority women earn more than white women with similar characteristics. For men, the pattern is similar, with the largest differentials of 24 and 21 per cent observed in Halifax and Montreal, respectively. Toronto and Winnipeg show middle-sized earnings differentials of 17 and 16 per cent, respectively. Vancouver shows earnings disparity of 6 per cent, and in Victoria the earnings of visible minority men are not statistically different from those of white men.

Table 2 suggests that Vancouver may be different from other Canadian cities in terms of the earnings disparity faced by its visible minority residents. One difference between Vancouver and the other cities is that its visible minority population is concentrated in a few very large groups, notably Chinese and South Asian. Pendakur and Pendakur (2002b) measure earnings disparity within the context of the size of the co-ethnic population in the city. They find that people with lots of co-ethnics residing in their city face smaller earnings

disparities than people with few co-ethnics residing in their city. A possible reason for this may be that large enclave populations can buffer the impact of economic discrimination by the majority. Another possibility is that the social barriers between ethnic groups dissolve as minority populations get larger and interactions between minority and majority people become more commonplace.

Corollary evidence can be found in Pendakur and Pendakur (2002a) who assess variation in the earnings differentials faced by visible minorities in Canada's three largest cities over 1970 to 1995. They find weak evidence that increasing minority populations over time is correlated with diminishing discrimination against visible minorities. Both Toronto and Vancouver saw large increases in visible minority populations over the last 30 years whereas Montreal saw a much smaller increase in that population during those years. Looking at the minority earnings differential by city over time, they find that in 1970, 1980 and 1985 the earnings differential faced by visible minority males in comparison with white males was about 8 to 10 per cent in all three cities. In 1990 and 1995, that differential was more than 20 per cent in Montreal. In Toronto and Vancouver, it grew only to about 15 and 8 per cent, respectively. Thus, the long-term trends for the relative earnings of visible minorities seem better in Toronto and Vancouver, the cities with the largest growth of minority populations.

4.5 Differences across visible minority groups?

Part of the challenge in examining issues related to minority outcomes is that there are many groups which fall within the definition of visible minority (and white). The heterogeneity of the group crosses ethnic and socio-economic lines. There are thus advantages to examining the subgroups which comprise

the visible minority category in order to see whether all groups face earnings gaps of roughly the same magnitude. Pendakur and Pendakur (2007b) investigate the pattern of earnings disparity across the ethnic groups comprising the visible minority category using Canadian-born respondents to the 2001 census. Table 3⁵ shows a selection of their results concerning the four largest visible minority ethnic groups: Caribbean/Black; Chinese; South Asian; and Arab/West Asian.

TABLE 3: EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS FOR SELECTED CANADIAN-BORN VISIBLE MINORITY GROUPS, COMPARED TO BRITISH ORIGIN, CANADA, 2001

	Females		Males	
	coef	sig	coef	sig
Caribbean/Black	-0.12	***	-0.16	***
Chinese	0.10	***	0.02	
South Asian	-0.06	**	-0.16	***
Arab/West Asian	-0.05		0.02	

Significance: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table 3 suggests that there is substantial variation in the degree to which different subgroups of visible minorities face earnings discrimination. Caribbean/Black men and women (born in Canada) fare the worst. Women in this grouping earn about 12 per cent less than their white (British-origin) counterparts, and men earn about 16 per cent less. In contrast, Chinese-origin women earn substantially more than white (British-origin) women with similar characteristics, and Chinese-origin men earn about the same. South Asian women face an earnings differential of 6 per cent while South Asian men face an earnings penalty of about 16 per cent. Arab or West Asian men and women do not face a statistically significant earnings differential. Thus, among the four largest groups comprising the visible minority aggregate, we see two

⁵ The figures in Table 3 are drawn from regressions in which the dependent variable is the log of earnings. Independent variables include age, education, marital status and household composition.

groups—Caribbean/Black and South Asian—which face severe disadvantage, and two groups—Chinese and Arab/West Asian—which do not face earnings disadvantage.

4.6 Glass ceilings: Disparity across the distribution

The preceding analysis used ordinary least squares regression methods to measure the average earnings gap faced by visible minority men and women. One could also ask how visible minorities at the bottom, or the top, of the distribution fare compared to white workers (see Table 4).

TABLE 4: EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS ACROSS THE DISTRIBUTION, CANADIAN-BORN VISIBLE MINORITIES COMPARED TO WHITE, CANADA, 2001

	q20		q50		q80		q90	
Sex	coef.	sig	coef.	sig	coef.	sig	coef.	sig
Females	-0.02		-0.02	***	-0.02	***	-0.02	***
Males	-0.15	***	-0.08	***	-0.08	***	-0.10	***

Significance: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Pendakur and Pendakur (2007b) estimate the earnings differential at four points in the distribution (the 20th, 50th, 80th and 90th percentile). At the 90th percentile this is similar to asking what is the earnings differential faced by visible minorities who are doing really well compared to white workers who are doing really well, controlling for personal characteristics. The analysis suggests that Canadian-born visible minority men at the top of the distribution earn about 10 per cent less than Canadian-born white men at the top of the distribution after controlling for age, education, marital status and city of residence. Visible minority men at the bottom quintile (20th percentile) of their earnings distribution given their observable characteristics earned 15 per cent less than white men at the bottom quintile of their earnings distribution. In contrast, visible minority women earned essentially the same as white women

at all points in the distribution. The story for visible minority men may thus have a glass ceiling interpretation. Visible minority men face substantial disparity at the top and the bottom of the conditional earnings distribution. This is consistent with an environment where visible minority men face poor access to the very best jobs in society, but better access to jobs in the middle of the distribution. In contrast, visible minority women seem to face no systematic barrier relative to white women, though this leaves open the question of what barriers women face relative to men.

4.7 Summary

The results above suggest the following:

1. Visible minorities, even those born in Canada, appear to earn less than majority workers.
2. Some of the gap can be explained away by education or labour market choices such as hours of work, but a substantial portion remains even after controlling for these characteristics.
3. The earnings differentials faced by visible minorities are persistent. They are not based on age, and they do not disappear from one census period to another.
4. The gap is very different by gender. Visible minority women do not face the same magnitude of earnings discrimination as do men. However, it should be noted that this is in large part due to the fact that women are more concentrated in low wage sectors of the economy (clerical and consumer services) which means there is less room to discriminate.

There is also evidence to suggest that immigrants have seen their place in the labour market deteriorate, particularly through the 1990s (see Tran 2004). Indeed, Picot et al. (2007), looking at poverty rates amongst immigrants, suggests that the situation has not improved through to 2004. In the same way, earnings differentials faced by Canadian-born visible minorities increased

through the 1980s before levelling off in the 1990s (Pendakur, Pendakur and Woodcock 2006).

5. DEFINING MOMENTS IN CULTURAL DIVERSITY

One way of assessing the changing nature of Canadian society is to look at practical and real situations. These can be called defining moments in cultural diversity. They generally have some element of decision making or controversy, and have a high profile, often generating substantial media coverage. They are defining moments because they end up defining something about our society, whether or not that is intended. Sometimes it is a low-profile incident that ends up grabbing the headlines for some period of time. Some of these "moments" may even last years or be repeated every year, but they are defining nevertheless.

Some moments are positive developments, such as a new policy or a new law. Some are problems such as racial incidents or continuing situations of equality that are exposed. Others are about minorities pushing new boundaries which may be subjected to push-back or even backlash. Positive or negative, these are the moments that have defined and continue to define the debate about diversity in Canada.

Following are a series of such moments with a summary analysis along some common indices.

1. **The Issue:**

The announcement of the Multiculturalism Policy

Time period:

October 8, 1971 and thereafter

Background:

Following up from the report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced that his government was establishing a Multiculturalism Policy in the House of Commons.

It was supported by all party leaders and while small in dollar expenditures, it came to describe a key attribute of Canadian society.

Groups directly affected:

While it appeared that ethnic minority communities were the first benefactors, many will argue that the policy, and more importantly its value and ethic, is what has helped our diverse society develop in a peaceful and constructive manner.

Groups indirectly affected:

Society at large

Aspect of culture, e.g. culture, ethnicity, race, religion:

Culture in the first instance, but a sense of nation-building as well.

What aspects affect integration?

If carried out as a twinning of celebrating differences and integrating different peoples, then it is a policy based on respect and integration.

What aspects affect separateness?

If the focus is on celebrating differences and facilitating people living in separate cultural enclaves, then this facilitates separateness.

How does it require changes to Canadian norms?

Since 1971, it has meant dropping the notion of biculturalism, since a country can hardly be bicultural and multicultural at the same time. It is one or the other.

Implications for personal or national security?

None

2. **The Issue:**

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Time period:

Passage and entrenchment of the Charter: 1982

Coming into force of the Equality Rights provisions within the Charter: 1985

Background:

After many years of planning and debate, the Charter of Rights was passed into law gaining constitutional status. In part it required that there would be no discrimination on a series of prescribed grounds. It also entrenched the concept of multiculturalism in the Charter and hence, the Constitution.

Groups directly affected:

Those who faced discrimination would be most directly affected

Groups indirectly affected:

All Canadians

Aspect of culture, e.g. culture, ethnicity, race, religion:

Issues of equality and a clearer outlawing of discrimination

What aspects affect integration?

Advancing equality for all Canadians

What aspects affect separateness?

None

How does it require changes to Canadian norms?

The federal government changed various laws to bring them in line with the Charter. Since the Charter has come into effect, the courts have struck down various laws that contravene the rights guaranteed in the Charter.

Implications for personal or national security?

It clarified certain rights for immigrants, racial minorities, women, persons with disabilities, etc., thus adding to their personal rights and security. There have been cases where accused criminals are guaranteed greater rights than they were before the Charter, prompting some to believe that the Charter has tipped the balance of rights in favour of the criminal over the victim.

3. **The Issue:**

The Canadian Multiculturalism Act

Time period:

1988

Background:

In response to two parliamentary committees, the Mulroney government brought in the Canadian Multiculturalism Act which was passed into law in 1988. The Act built on the 1971 policy and required all federal departments and agencies to implement multicultural policies in relation to their particular mandate.

Groups directly affected:

Canadian society

Groups indirectly affected:

Canadian society

Aspect of culture, e.g. culture, ethnicity, race, religion:

Culture in the largest sense and nation-building

What aspects affect integration?

Increasing a sense of equality for all

What aspects affect separateness?

None

How does it require changes to Canadian norms?

A requirement of federal departments and agencies ensuring that their policies and programs are reflective of the diversity in Canadian society.

Implications for personal or national security?

None

4. **The Issue:**

The Employment Equity Act

Time period:

Act passed in 1986

Background:

Following a Royal Commission on Equality in Employment, the Mulroney government introduced and passed the Act.

Groups directly affected:

The four designated groups are: women, visible minorities, Aboriginal peoples and persons with disabilities.

Groups indirectly affected:

Employers in the public sector and those regulated by, or who conduct business with, the federal government.

Aspect of culture, e.g. culture, ethnicity, race, religion:

Equality in employment

What aspects affect integration?

Integration in employment

What aspects affect separateness?

When the policy focuses on numbers only, there can be an emphasis of getting people from designated groups into certain positions, sometimes causing quality and qualifications to be sacrificed.

How does it require changes to Canadian norms?

Required a more open and flexible approach to hiring.

Implications for personal or national security?

None

5. **The Issue:**

Increased immigration levels

Time period:

Late 1980s

Background:

The Government of Canada increased the levels of immigration from around 84,000 to around 225,000 (targeted to be about 1 per cent of the existing Canadian population) in large part because of a growing sense that labour shortages in Canada were looming.

Groups directly affected:

New immigrants and Canadians with families who wanted to migrate to Canada.

Groups indirectly affected:

Employers

Aspect of culture, e.g. culture, ethnicity, race, religion:

High immigration, mostly from non-white countries and to some extent of non-Christian religions, is causing the makeup of Canadian society to change.

What aspects affect integration?

Increased immigration would mean an increased need for immigrant integration services.

What aspects affect separateness?

Would large scale immigration result in the growth of enclaves.

How does it require changes to Canadian norms?

Canadian society would change more rapidly than in a long time in terms of newcomers, where they were coming from, and the large number of non-whites and non-Christians.

Implications for personal or national security?

Technically no implications, although some believed that it would increase the risk of problematic immigrants coming in.

6. **The Issue:** Turban in the RCMP: Should uniformed RCMP personnel be able to wear the turban?

Time period:

First became an issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Constable Baltej Singh Dhillon applied to wear his turban as part of his uniform.

Background:

Mr. Dhillon applied to join the RCMP in the late 1980s and passed all the requirements, but was asked to conform to uniform by removing his turban and cutting his hair. He applied to the Commissioner of the RCMP for an exemption on religious grounds. There was strong opposition to this request from some quarters, which resulted in considerable political controversy. The issue was "settled" when the Minister of Justice informed the House of Commons on March 15, 1990, that RCMP uniform regulations would be amended to allow for accommodation to dress requirements required by religion and spirituality, which would include the Sikh turban, the Jewish yarmulke and First Nations braids. Controversy nevertheless continued for some years after.

The issue brought various aspects of human rights and national identity together. On the one hand were people who felt the traditions of the RCMP, a key icon of Canadian culture and identity, should not be changed to accommodate religious minorities or should not be determined by religion at all. On the other hand was the request that an individual's freedom of religion, as guaranteed by the Charter of Rights, should not be infringed upon by a government agency.

Groups directly affected:

Sikhs were the first group affected as the request came from that group, but other groups who had religiously determined dress codes had similar concerns and were in the end positively affected by the government's ruling.

Groups indirectly affected:

Other groups included Jews (yarmulkes), Muslims (hijabs), First Nations people (braids).

Aspect of culture, e.g. culture, ethnicity, race, religion:

The concern here was primarily a religion and spirituality issue. For Sikhs the issue is defined religiously. For Muslim women there are a variety of views whether this is a religious issue alone or whether it is a religiously influenced cultural issue.

What aspects affect integration?

For a baptized Sikh who follows the requirement of not cutting his hair and wearing a turban, the ability to wear the turban enhances integration. Despite the opposition from within the RCMP and certain elements in the public, Mr. Dhillon wanted to serve in his country's national police force, and was determined to do so, while maintaining his religious obligations.

What aspects affect separateness?

It was also argued that Mr. Dhillon was not integrating into the mainstream of the RCMP, but would rather stand out and be different. For some, integrating meant fitting in and not standing out. It became a debate about integration versus assimilation.

How does it require changes to Canadian norms?

Whether or not a change to Canadian norms is required depends on one's perspective. On the one hand are those who see this as accommodating one, and in time, a few individuals of the Sikh faith. Others see it as fundamentally changing the uniform, and hence the image and identity of a Canadian icon.

Implications for personal or national security?

Again this depends on perspective. Some see a turban as a security hazard, perhaps more so in the armed forces where a cloth turban is worn instead of a metal helmet when in combat. For the RCMP itself, some also see it as undermining the authority of an RCMP officer, hence reducing the authority compared to an officer with a regular uniform.

7. **The Issue:**

The turban in Legion halls: The Royal Canadian Legion banned headgear at Legion halls

Time period:

Mid-nineties

Background:

The Royal Canadian Legion, a non-governmental association, passed a resolution banning the wearing of headgear in Legion halls, in keeping with their tradition. This ban would affect members of the Legion and non-members alike. While the policy was stated in neutral terms it had the direct effect of banning the wearing of turbans on Legion premises.

Groups directly affected:

Canadian Sikhs

Groups indirectly affected:

Religious minorities that require head coverings

Aspect of culture, e.g. culture, ethnicity, race, religion:

Religious adherence is the key issue, as baptized Sikhs are required to not cut their hair and wear a turban.

What aspects affect integration?

Sikhs who wore the turban, and were veterans of the British Army, wanted to be able to use Legion halls the way all other veterans wanted to.

What aspects affect separateness?

From those who opposed the wearing of the turban in the Legion halls there was a sense that wearing a turban was not integrative and was based on remaining separate.

How does it require changes to Canadian norms?

The rule is no headdress in the Legion halls. To allow turbans would mean removing a longstanding rule that had been observed by members as the norm for Legion halls.

Implications for personal or national security?

None

8. **The Issue:**

Adoption of Sharia law in Canada

Time period:

Religious arbitration has been exercised by other religious groups for family matters in Ontario. The issue of Sharia law in Ontario came to a head in 2005, but had been developing for a few years.

Background:

Religious law was permitted in issues of family arbitration in some cases, primarily for Jewish ones. As the application for Sharia law progressed in Ontario, the Ontario government appointed a former attorney general, Marion Boyd, to review the matter and make recommendations. She recommended that Sharia law be permitted in a report entitled *Dispute resolution in family law: protecting choice, promoting inclusion*. The release of her report caused a huge outcry from the women's movement and the moderate elements in the Muslim community, and the controversy grew with the Quebec government taking the position that Sharia law would not be permitted in that province. Ultimately, in September of 2005, the Ontario government made a snap decision to ban Sharia law and all other religion-based laws for family arbitration purposes.

Groups directly affected:

Canadian Muslims

Groups indirectly affected:

Other religious communities, especially Canadian Jews

Aspect of culture, e.g. culture, ethnicity, race, religion:

Religion primarily, although culture in a broader sense as many Muslims do not feel the need to adhere to Sharia law—it being more of a cultural norm to adhere or not to adhere to the religious tenets.

What aspects affect integration?

Adopting of Sharia law would allow observant Muslims to live in Canadian society while fully adhering to this religious law.

What aspects affect separateness?

Adhering to Sharia law indicates a desire to live outside the mainstream norms of Canada. While such individuals can be living in an integrated lifestyle in terms of work, school, etc. their family arbitration would be outside the norm, and depending on how you interpret Sharia law, other aspects would come into play, e.g., polygamy or harsh punishment for certain crimes such as flogging for robbery and the death penalty for adultery.

How does it require changes to Canadian norms?

While the norms for the mainstream would remain intact, adherents would live by other rules. This could affect areas such as social services, the courts and the penal system.

Implications for personal or national security?

Depending on the degree to which Sharia law would be allowed it could affect personal security, most notably women's equality.

9. **The Issue:**

Apology for past wrongs to specific communities: Japanese Canadians and Chinese Canadians

Time period:

Ongoing but 1988 and 2006 being key points

Background:

During World War II, Canadians of Japanese ancestry were interned as enemy alien. All their property including homes, businesses and fishing boats were confiscated and they were interned in POW camps in a few regions of Canada, all away from the west coast, where many had lived. Years later, in 1998, the government of Brian Mulroney issued an apology in Parliament and provided symbolic financial compensation to survivors and their descendents.

At various points in the 1900s, the Canadian Parliament passed laws that specifically discriminated against Chinese Canadians to keep Chinese immigrants from coming to Canada and from being given the right to vote. In 2006, the government of Stephen Harper issued an apology and provided symbolic compensation to survivors of the Chinese Head Tax, which had taxed each Chinese immigrant upon arrival, a tax that did not apply to any other immigrants.

Despite these moves, there have always been those opposed to such an apology or compensation, either on the grounds that current governments cannot be held responsible for acts of previous governments, or that if you do this for one group, there will be many more to follow who feel they have been wronged. Some have called it re-writing history, although this is less the case. Rather what is sought is a writing of all aspects of history rather than overlooking of certain aspects because they are unpleasant, and in essence "righting the wrong" that was earlier committed.

Groups directly affected:

Japanese Canadians and Chinese Canadians

Groups indirectly affected:

Other communities who have been wronged at earlier times, including Aboriginal peoples and Acadians.

Aspect of culture, e.g. culture, ethnicity, race, religion:

Culture in a broad sense, more a matter of history and sense of belonging for these groups, who seek being recognized as equal citizens.

What aspects affect integration?

People who feel they were set apart and who seek recognition as full and equal citizens.

What aspects affect separateness?

Some might see this as picking out certain groups for special treatment.

How does it require changes to Canadian norms?

It seems the norm has been to repeal bad laws or end bad policy and close the book on the issue. Apologies are not the norm and require a revisiting of past injustices.

Implications for personal or national security?

None

10. **The Issue:**

Declaration from Herouxville town council

Time period:

2007

Background:

In the small town of Herouxville, 165 km northwest of Montreal, the town council passed a resolution welcoming immigrants to settle there but requiring them to adopt the local norms and values. In a document entitled *Publication of Standards*, the city council provides various examples of what this entails, several points being to stress gender equality in all aspects of life, including sports, entertainment, work and provision of health care. Some of these issues are common sense, while others are a bit more blunt, for example, "we consider that killing women in public beatings or burning them alive are not part of our standards of life."

Groups directly affected:

Citizens of Herouxville. Immigrants who have practices outside the norm in that town.

Groups indirectly affected:

Immigrant groups who are significantly different from the norm in Herouxville. Some parts were apparently aimed at groups that have attire and food restrictions.

Aspect of culture, e.g. culture, ethnicity, race, religion:

Culture, ethnicity and religion are all part of the debate here.

What aspects affect integration?

Primarily overall integration, but also some aspects of gender equality.

What aspects affect separateness?

The declaration does not want separateness and maps out a system that is closer to assimilation.

How does it require changes to Canadian norms?

In this case the town is saying they will not tolerate what they deem to be un-Canadian norms.

Implications for personal or national security?

None

11. **The Issue:**

Celebrating Christmas in a multireligious Canada

Time period:

A perennial issue that comes up every December

Background:

For a long time Canada has been a primarily Christian country, albeit a secular society in many ways. Separation of church and state is a value often mentioned. Nevertheless, schools have had Christmas concerts, people widely wish each other a "Merry Christmas," Christmas decorations and trees go up in many public places like city halls, community centres and office buildings. In recent years much of these traditions have been questioned or changed, and not without much controversy. Less focus on Christmas has been a result of a growing secularization among Christians, but some of the more high-profile attention has been with regard to the accommodation of non-Christians and reducing celebrations so as not to offend them. Sometimes this offending is real and oftentimes imagined, i.e., not doing something in case it will offend a non-Christian. There are in fact a majority of non-Christians who are not offended by Christmas celebrations at all.

There is also a myth that today's immigrants are non-Christian. While the number of non-Christian immigrants is growing, it is important to remember that there are still a large number of Christian immigrants coming to the country from places like Latin America, Europe, the Philippines and Africa.

Groups directly affected:

Some Christians feel they are affected as their celebration of Christmas is seemingly curtailed or limited, so as not to offend non-Christians.

Some non-Christians also feel aggrieved as they feel left out or forced to celebrate an occasion that is not part of their religious tradition.

Aspect of culture, e.g. culture, ethnicity, race, religion:

While Christmas is a religious occasion in its origins, its celebration today also has a lot of cultural significance, for many who may not be practicing Christians.

What aspects affect integration?

Christians do not want to feel that they have to reduce their own celebration in order to facilitate the integration of newcomers.

What aspects affect separateness?

There is a feeling among some Christians that they are being asked to separate themselves from society to practice their religious occasions.

How does it require changes to Canadian norms?

There is a concern that the Christian mainstream is having to change to accommodate newcomers and new non-Christian immigrants.

Implications for personal or national security?

None

The preceding moments suggest that Canadian society has a history of addressing issues of societal change based on diversity, rather than ignoring the issue and letting it fester. The process of debate is important because it shows a willingness to examine the implications of potential change rather than label such change a threat to be combated.

When such issues are addressed, there is no guarantee that the resolution will be in favour of the minority group. However, there is assurance that the issue will be discussed within the context of respecting, understanding and accepting diversity. This willingness to face such issues constitutes a true advantage over the way these issues may be dealt with in other countries, and is perhaps a result of past negotiations based on the English-French dichotomy. Such debate must continue and expand to include questions related to full participation, representation and the sharing of political and economic power (Dib 2006).

6 DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS

6.1 Projections

In 2005, Statistics Canada released a report containing five projections of visible minority groups to the year 2017 based on the 2001 population. The five projections utilize different immigration levels, fertility rates and internal migration rates (see Table 5). Scenario A is a low growth scenario driven primarily by low immigration and fertility assumptions. Scenario B and C are moderate growth scenarios based primarily on 2001 fertility and immigration assumptions. Scenario D is a high growth scenario which assumes high fertility and high immigration intake. A fifth scenario assumes high immigration levels combined with moderate fertility levels. Based on the scenarios, the visible minority population is projected to grow between 56 and 111 per cent over the 16-year period. This means, depending on the projection utilized, Canada's visible minority population could be anywhere from 6.3 million to 8.5 million by the year 2017 (see Table 5). Box 1 provides highlights drawn from the executive summary of the report.

The projections suggest that Canada's visible minority population will grow substantially by the year 2017. It also suggests that the majority of this growth will take place in Ontario and British Columbia, with specific concentration in Toronto and Vancouver (see Table 6).

Statistics Canada identifies Scenario B as the reference scenario. This scenario assumes immigration rates, fertility rates and internal migration rates similar to those experienced in 2001. In this sense, it represents a conserva-

tive set of assumptions which are likely to occur over the 16-year projection period.⁶

TABLE 5: PROJECTION SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS

Name	Immigration characteristics	Fertility	Mortality		Internal migration
			Males	Females	
Scenario A	Low growth intake: 180,000; 67% visible minority	1.3	80	84	2000-2001
Scenario B	Reference intake: 225,000; 1996–2001 proportions	1.5	80	84	2000-2001
Scenario C	Internal migration 1996 intake: 225,000; 1996–2001 proportions	1.5	80	84	1995-1996
Scenario D	High growth intake: 270,000; 80% visible minority	1.8	80	84	2000-2001
Scenario E	1% immigration intake: 1% of population, 1996– 2001 proportions	1.5	80	84	2000-2001

Source: Statistics Canada – Catalogue no. 91-541-XIE

⁶ The projections make a number of assumptions about how to assign people to different groups—'intergenerational transfers of mother tongue depend on the mother's mother tongue, immigrant status and area of residence; transfers of visible minority group depend on the mother's immigrant status and visible minority group; and religious denomination transfers are influenced solely by the mother's religious denomination. Finally, the child's sex is assigned at random to ensure that, overall, the sex ratio at birth is maintained.' (91-541-XIE. page 4).

TABLE 6: 2001 AND 2017 (REFERENCE PROJECTION) VISIBLE MINORITY POPULATIONS FOR SELECTED CMAs AND REGIONS

	2001 (base population)			2017 (reference scenario)			2001-2017
	# visible minorities (000's)	% of total vm pop	% vm of total region population	# visible minorities (000's)	% of total vm pop	% vm of total region population	% increase in vm pop
Canada	4,037.5	1	13%	7,120.7	1	21%	76%
Halifax	25	1%	7%	35	0%	9%	39%
Rest of Nova Scotia	10	0%	2%	12	0%	2%	22%
Montreal	454	11%	13%	749	11%	19%	65%
Rest of metropolitan Quebec	27	1%	2%	44	1%	3%	62%
Non-metropolitan Quebec	12	0%	0%	22	0%	1%	88%
Toronto	1,753	43%	37%	3,194	45%	51%	82%
Ottawa-Gatineau (Ontario part)	139	3%	17%	316	4%	28%	127%
Hamilton	64	2%	9%	125	2%	15%	97%
Kitchener	45	1%	10%	79	1%	16%	77%
Windsor	40	1%	13%	97	1%	23%	140%
London	38	1%	9%	62	1%	13%	62%
Rest of metropolitan Ontario	51	1%	5%	92	1%	7%	82%
Non-metropolitan Ontario	67	2%	2%	126	2%	4%	89%
Winnipeg	84	2%	12%	115	2%	16%	37%
Rest of Manitoba	5	0%	1%	6	0%	1%	27%
Calgary	166	4%	17%	295	4%	24%	78%
Edmonton	136	3%	14%	211	3%	18%	56%
Rest of Alberta	29	1%	3%	55	1%	4%	91%
Vancouver	741	18%	36%	1,261	18%	49%	70%
Victoria	27	1%	8%	37	1%	11%	38%
Abbotsford	27	1%	18%	43	1%	26%	60%
Rest of British Columbia	58	1%	4%	80	1%	5%	38%

Source: 2001-2017 projection tables, Statistics Canada, Demography Division

Tables 7a and 7b provides the 2017 detailed projection data by ethnic group drawn from reference projection. The visible minority population is projected to be just over 7 million, with about half being either Chinese or South Asian. The Atlantic region will remain the region with the lowest proportion of visible minorities (1 per cent of the population in Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, 5

**Box 1:
Projection highlights
Growth of the visible
minority population**

- Canada is projected to have between 6.3 and 8.5 million visible minority persons in 2017 (between 19 and 23 per cent of the total population).
- Immigrants are projected to account for 22.2 per cent of Canada's population.
- Roughly half the visible minority population will be either South Asian or Chinese origin (between 3.2 million and 4.4 million people) by 2017.
- The black population is expected to number between 948,000 and 1,177,000 in 2017, compared with about 671,000 in 2001.

**Age structure of the visible
minority population**

- The visible minority population will remain younger than the rest of the population in 2017. For every 100 visible minority persons old enough to leave the labour force (the 55-64 age group), there are projected to be 142 old enough to join the labour

force (the 15-24 age group). In the rest of the population, there will only be 75 potential entries for every 100 potential exits.

Provincial distribution

- Three-quarters of the visible minority population is projected to live in either Ontario or British Columbia (4,090,000 and 1,421,000 visible minority persons respectively).
- Nearly one of every three people living in British Columbia is projected to be a member of a visible minority group in 2017.

**The Census Metropolitan
Areas**

- Almost 75 per cent of visible minority persons will be living in Toronto, Vancouver or Montreal.
- More than half the population of the Toronto and Vancouver Census Metropolitan Areas is projected to belong to a visible minority group.
- Almost half (47 per cent) of the visible minority population in the Vancouver CMA is projected to be Chinese.

per cent in Nova Scotia and 2 per cent in New Brunswick).⁷ Visible minorities will continue to locate in Canada's major urban centres. According to the projection, almost 80 per cent of visible minorities will live in Montreal, Toronto or Vancouver. This proportion is almost the same as in 2001. The groups experiencing the highest level of growth will be West Asian (69 per cent), Arab (59 per cent), Korean (59 per cent) and South Asian (49 per cent).

Immigration will

continue to drive growth in the visible minority population, but it is notable that an increasing proportion of the visible minority population will be born in

⁷ It should be remembered that the reference scenario (and indeed four of the five scenarios) assume similar migration patterns as were seen in 2001. Thus it is not surprising that the visible minority population should remain concentrated in the same cities as was the case in 2001. However, it is possible that visible minorities will gravitate to second-tier cities (such as London or Victoria) over the next 10 years.

Canada. By 2017, about one-third of visible minorities present in 2017 will be born in Canada.

Table 8 shows results from the reference projection of immigrants from 2006 to 2017 using 2001 immigration intake assumptions. Because of relatively low fertility rates on the part of the Canadian-born population, the projection suggests that the proportion of immigrants will rise steadily from 18.3 per cent in 2001 to about 22 per cent in 2017. This is the highest proportion of immigrants Canada has seen since the 1920s. Given that the average visible minority population will be younger than the white population (but not younger than the Aboriginal population) and that immigrants in general will be more likely to be of working age than the Canadian-born population, this suggests that Canada will be increasingly reliant on both Aboriginal and visible minority groups to fill labour force requirements, particularly in Canada's large CMAs.

Statistics Canada also conducted projections of religious groups and mother tongue. These projections suggest that there will be substantial growth in the number of people claiming non-Christian religions and moderate growth in the number of people claiming non-official mother tongues. It should be noted however that these projections assume a direct inheritance of the characteristics of the parents (thus Sikh parents, mothers in particular, will beget Sikh children) and there is no accommodation for shift or loss of religion. In the same way, the model does not allow for the inter-generational loss of mother tongues.

TABLE 7A: POPULATION¹ BY VISIBLE MINORITY GROUP, CANADA, PROVINCES, 2017 (IN THOUSANDS)

Provinces	Chinese	South Asian	Black	Filipino	Latin American	South-east Asian	Arab	West	Korean	Japanese	Others ²	Total
Canada	1,819.7	1,832.1	1,037.6	542.1	337.0	280.3	423.0	276.0	202.6	85.5	284.7	7,120.7
Newfoundland and Labrador	1.2	1.7	1.6	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	6.3
Prince Edward Island	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.9
Nova Scotia	5.0	5.6	21.6	1.2	0.8	1.5	6.5	0.8	1.1	0.5	1.8	46.4
New Brunswick	2.8	2.8	5.4	0.7	0.8	0.6	1.0	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.9	16.0
Quebec	105.8	100.6	223.7	32.5	84.6	53.8	149.6	26.1	7.7	4.0	26.0	814.3
Ontario	909.9	1,228.8	647.0	279.5	175.3	133.5	206.2	174.0	112.7	30.5	193.2	4,090.5
Manitoba	15.5	22.8	16.7	37.5	6.4	7.6	2.7	2.0	2.5	2.0	5.0	120.6
Saskatchewan	8.4	5.1	8.3	4.5	2.4	3.5	2.3	0.7	0.9	0.5	1.4	38.1
Alberta	145.9	130.4	61.9	61.3	28.6	33.4	35.1	15.4	18.4	11.2	20.0	561.3
British Columbia	624.3	333.2	50.3	123.8	37.7	45.8	19.1	56.3	58.7	36.3	35.9	1,421.4
Territories	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.3	4.1

1. Average population excluding non-permanent residents.

2. Multiple visible minorities or not elsewhere identified.

Source: Statistics Canada, Demography Division.

Table 7b: Population¹ by visible minority group, Canada, regions, 2017 (in thousands)

Regions	Chinese	South Asian	Black	Filipino	Latin American	South-east Asian	Arab	West	Korean	Japanese	Others ²	Total
Halifax	3.7	4.1	15.5	0.9	0.6	1.2	5.8	0.6	0.8	0.3	1.1	34.7
Rest of Nova Scotia	1.3	1.5	6.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.7	11.7
Montreal	95.1	93.5	201.2	30.9	78.6	49.7	142.0	24.4	6.6	3.0	23.6	748.6
Rest of metropolitan Quebec	7.1	4.9	14.5	0.9	4.1	2.8	5.9	1.3	0.5	0.5	1.5	44.1
Non-metropolitan Quebec	3.5	2.2	8.0	0.7	1.9	1.3	1.7	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.8	21.6
Toronto	735.1	1,026.0	473.8	236.8	128.4	85.2	106.8	140.5	82.9	21.3	157.3	3,194.0
Ottawa-Gatineau ³	65.9	59.0	69.5	13.2	15.6	16.2	44.3	12.4	7.1	2.6	9.8	315.6
Hamilton	22.9	33.4	19.5	7.7	6.9	7.1	11.0	5.0	4.7	1.3	5.7	125.1
Kitchener	15.1	21.3	12.3	2.8	5.7	5.6	5.0	3.7	3.2	0.7	3.6	79.0
Windsor	18.1	23.9	15.3	5.0	3.8	4.3	16.0	3.6	2.5	0.5	3.6	96.6
London	10.6	12.2	11.2	2.5	4.2	3.5	8.7	2.6	2.7	0.6	3.0	61.9
Rest of metropolitan Ontario	18.1	22.7	18.7	4.8	4.6	4.2	6.3	2.4	4.2	1.4	4.6	92.1
Non-metropolitan Ontario	24.1	30.3	26.7	6.7	6.0	7.2	8.1	3.9	5.3	2.2	5.8	126.3
Winnipeg	14.2	21.9	15.4	36.7	6.1	7.3	2.4	1.9	2.4	1.9	4.7	114.9
Rest of Manitoba	1.3	0.9	1.3	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	5.7
Calgary	79.8	73.5	28.4	30.6	14.6	17.4	16.1	9.2	10.5	4.8	10.1	295.2
Edmonton	53.5	47.0	25.5	24.7	10.7	12.8	15.6	4.7	5.7	3.6	7.4	211.2
Rest of Alberta	12.5	9.8	7.9	6.0	3.3	3.1	3.3	1.5	2.1	2.8	2.5	54.9
Vancouver	591.4	270.6	36.3	112.7	30.6	38.4	16.5	53.0	52.7	28.4	30.8	1,261.4
Victoria	13.4	7.1	4.1	3.3	1.7	1.9	0.7	0.9	1.1	2.0	1.0	37.2
Abbotsford	3.4	29.0	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.0	0.4	0.9	1.3	0.9	1.1	42.6
Rest of British Columbia	16.2	26.5	8.5	6.1	3.9	4.5	1.5	1.5	3.5	5.0	3.0	80.3

1. Average population excluding non-permanent residents.

2. Multiple visible minorities or not elsewhere identified.

3. Ontario part only.

Source: Statistics Canada, Demography Division.

TABLE 8. POPULATION¹ BY IMMIGRATION STATUS, CANADA, PROVINCES AND REGIONS, 2017 (IN THOUSANDS). SCENARIO B

	Immigrants	Non-immigrants	Total	Immigrants (%)
<u>Provinces</u>				
Canada	7,685.9	26,896.3	34,582.2	22.2
Newfoundland and Labrador	7.7	459.3	467.1	1.7
Prince Edward Island	4.7	139.7	144.4	3.2
Nova Scotia	46.1	884.7	930.9	5.0
New Brunswick	23.7	715.1	738.7	3.2
Quebec	957.4	6,737.3	7,694.7	12.4
Ontario	4,432.4	9,769.0	14,201.4	31.2
Manitoba	143.4	1,000.7	1,144.1	12.5
Saskatchewan	48.1	872.3	920.4	5.2
Alberta	600.4	3,093.2	3,693.7	16.3
British Columbia	1,416.3	3,129.4	4,545.7	31.2
Territories	5.7	95.4	101.1	5.6
<u>Regions</u>				
Halifax	29.3	376.6	405.9	7.2
Rest of Nova Scotia	16.8	508.1	525.0	3.2
Montreal	845.3	3,052.3	3,897.7	21.7
Rest of metropolitan Quebec	62.3	1,324.6	1,386.9	4.5
Non-metropolitan Quebec	49.8	2,360.4	2,410.2	2.1
Toronto	3,102.2	3,213.5	6,315.7	49.1
Ottawa-Gatineau ²	309.5	820.8	1,130.3	27.4
Hamilton	208.4	601.9	810.3	25.7
Kitchener	127.9	381.7	509.6	25.1
Windsor	116.5	299.4	415.9	28.0
London	93.7	395.7	489.5	19.2
Rest of metropolitan Ontario	165.8	1,068.5	1,234.3	13.4
Non-metropolitan Ontario	308.3	2,987.5	3,295.8	9.4
Winnipeg	117.2	616.1	733.4	16.0
Rest of Manitoba	26.2	384.6	410.8	6.4
Calgary	288.9	962.4	1,251.4	23.1
Edmonton	210.1	972.6	1,182.8	17.8
Rest of Alberta	101.4	1,158.2	1,259.6	8.0
Vancouver	1,139.1	1,421.2	2,560.3	44.5
Victoria	59.3	267.9	327.2	18.1
Abbotsford	40.3	126.1	166.4	24.2
Rest of British Columbia	177.6	1,314.1	1,491.7	11.9

1. Average population excluding non-permanent residents.

2. Ontario part only.

Source: Statistics Canada, Demography Division.

The projection of religious groups suggests that there will be substantial growth of the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh populations (69 per cent, 48 per cent

and 39 per cent respectively). As was the case for the visible minority projections, almost all this growth will take place in the large urban areas.

6.2 Summary on demographic factors

The projections conducted by Statistics Canada point to increasing ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity over the next ten years. Such diversity will, however, be concentrated in Canada's major cities, particularly those west of Montreal. Overall, the projections suggest that the number of visible minorities in Canada's CMAs will increase quite dramatically. The number of visible minorities is expected to more than double in Ottawa and Windsor. The number will increase by over 50 per cent in Montreal, Toronto, Hamilton, Kitchener, London, Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver. In Halifax, the visible minority population is expected to grow by 39 per cent.

However, because the assumptions regarding mobility and settlement are based on 2001 patterns, the projections also suggest that the distribution of visible minorities will not change dramatically. Toronto, for example, will be home to about 45 per cent of Canada's visible minority population. About 18 per cent will live in Vancouver and 11 per cent in Montreal. These percentages are almost the same as was the case in 2001. Granted, there is projected to be growth in Quebec cities outside Montreal and other second-tier cities in the rest of Canada, but the reality is that, based on these projections, the bulk of visible minorities will continue to live in the large urban centres west of Montreal.

As is the case now, the mix of visible minority groups will differ by city. Cities to the east of Montreal will remain relatively homogenous. Chinese and South Asian, the largest visible minority groups in Vancouver today will continue to be the largest groups a decade from now, albeit more numerous. In

Montreal, Black and Arab groups will continue to be the most numerous visible minority groups. The proportion of immigrants in Canada's population will be marginally higher, but as is the case today, this will be concentrated in the large urban centres, particularly Toronto and Vancouver.

What does this mean for the trends that we witnessed earlier in the report?

6.3 Visible minorities in 2017

6.3.1 Demographics

The Statistics Canada projections suggest that given present trends, cities like Vancouver and Toronto will be characterized by increased levels of diversity, particularly as compared to cities to the east of Montreal. Thus Canada may be developing in 2 ways—growing and increasingly diverse cities (with populations driven by immigration), and other centres which could very well be characterized by slower growth as a product of fewer immigrants choosing to locate there. Given that the projections also assume population growth overall will be driven by immigration, it is possible to see a situation where only cities able to attract immigrants, and by extension, visible minorities, will grow.

Immigration is in many ways non-negotiable. Without immigration intake, Canada would face a rapidly aging population, a shrunken workforce, a smaller GDP, a higher dependence ratio on social services, and a smaller tax base and aggregate savings (Dib 2006). While not eliminating such challenges, immigration at least slows the processes by bringing in people who are on average younger and more likely to be active in the labour force.

The projections assume 2001 mobility patterns—immigrants will move where they moved in the past. This means that the large centres like Toronto and Vancouver, which have traditionally been draws for immigrants and visible minorities, will continue to do so. Smaller centres such as Halifax will see an increase in the visible minority population, but not nearly to the same extent. The visible majority proportion of the urban population will however rise in most of the major centres.

If we relax the assumptions about where visible minorities and immigrants choose to live, it is possible to envisage a situation in which minorities begin to move to the second-tier cities (in much the same way that Canadian-born whites do). Indeed, this is the goal of the immigration point system which allocates points for immigrants who choose not to locate in Montreal, Toronto or Vancouver. At the same time, however, visible minorities have to have a reason to move to these cities, and so far this has not been the case.

The changing nature of Aboriginal peoples in urban centres is equally profound. Today, about half the Aboriginal population is urban and about half the population is below the age of 25. This is one of the fastest growing segments of our population. Cities like Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Prince Albert, Calgary and Edmonton have the most rapidly growing Aboriginal populations.

6.3.2 Poverty and discrimination

Studies conducted at the federal Department of Human Resources and Social Development Canada suggest that recent immigrants are at greater risk of falling into poverty than average. Indeed 15 per cent of recent immigrants experience persistent low income.⁸ Palmeta (2004), looking at poverty

⁸ HRSDC defines recent immigrants as immigrants who arrived in Canada within the last 10 years. Persistent low income is a concept which incorporates the dimensions of incidence, depth and duration. It compares the aggregate income of persons and households over a six-year period with the aggregate of their low-income thresholds over that period; in this case to the post-income tax Low Income Cut-offs.

amongst immigrants, concluded that “visible minority immigrants were more likely than other immigrants to be exposed to low income, even among immigrants who had been in Canada for over 17 years” (p. 17, see also Picot et al. 2007). Given the estimate of 225,000 immigrants per year used by Statistics Canada this translates to roughly 340,000 recent immigrants living in persistent poverty over the next decade. These immigrants will be concentrated in Canada’s largest cities, with over half living in Toronto and Vancouver and a further 11 per cent in Montreal.

Palmeta also concluded that Canadian-born visible minorities were no more likely to experience poverty than their Canadian-born white counterparts. However, Canadian-born visible minorities who did experience poverty were more likely to experience it for a longer period of time.

The projections suggest that immigrants and visible minorities will make up an increasing portion of the general population, and in particular the labour force population. This means that their ability to succeed in the work environment will become more important over time. Previous research has suggested that many visible minority groups face an earnings penalty in the wage labour force and that these penalties have not diminished over time. There is also some evidence to suggest that a large co-ethnic population is capable of buffering the impact of discrimination on the part of the majority. Pendakur and Pendakur (2002b) find some evidence that people who live in cities with many co-ethnics face smaller earnings disparities than people with few co-ethnics residing in their city. It is possible therefore that a large ethnic enclave is capable of buffering the impact of economic discrimination by the majority.

Persons and households whose aggregate post-income tax income over the six-year period is lower than the aggregate of their post-income tax Low Income Cut-offs are said to live in persistent low income (Hatfield 2006).

It is also possible that the definition of “the other” changes as the size of the minority population increases. For example, as the number of Chinese and South Asians increases in Vancouver to the point where they are no longer considered a minority, interactions between groups become more commonplace and barriers between groups disappear. Thus as minority populations rise in Canadian cities, we may expect ethnically-based economic discrimination to diminish. The preceding assumes that mere size is enough to reduce barriers. However, if it is not size, but rather group characteristics, such as the proportion of self-employed and level of institutional completeness, then there is no guarantee that the differentials will decrease.⁹

Different visible minority groups do not face the same level of earnings disparity. At the Canada-wide level, Caribbean and South Asian men appear to face earnings penalties of about 16 per cent. Chinese and Arab and West Asians born in Canada earn about the same as British origin Canadian-born workers.

Visible minorities whose origins are partly European also face markedly smaller differentials in labour market performance (see Pendakur and Pendakur 2007b). Intermarriage between visible minority and white spouses should therefore lead to a decrease in the overall earnings penalty faced by the total visible minority group, but not necessarily by any individual group. Given that immigrants tend to be of single origin, the visible minority–European majority population will be a product of intermarriage between immigrants and whites or between visible minorities born in Canada and European or majority origin Canadians. Work on ethnic intermarriage suggests those rates are much higher for the Canadian-born population than for the immigrant population (in part

⁹ In the case of Aboriginals, for example, high co-ethnic populations are correlated with lower earnings (see Pendakur and Pendakur 2007a).

because many immigrants arrive married). Thus a rising Canadian-born visible minority population will result in a rising “visible minority–majority mixed” population. The next decade may therefore see the decline of an overall visible minority earnings differential driven by the growth of visible minorities with partly European (white) origins.¹⁰ Another consequence of intermarriage may be a decrease in discrimination since high rates of intermarriage should also result in higher rates of inter-ethnic tolerance. This could in turn result in lower earnings differentials on average.

Changing the mix of visible minorities—increasing the proportion who are at least partly European or majority origin, or increasing the proportion who are Chinese or Arab or West Asian origin—will mean that the overall earnings gap measured for visible minorities will fall over time. However, this will do nothing for the gap faced by visible minority groups who do encounter an earnings penalty. Indeed, Canadian-born black men have been facing an earnings penalty in excess of 16 per cent since the 1970s (Pendakur, Pendakur and Woodcock 2006). Further, the earnings gap has been growing over time. This means that it will be more important to look at outcomes for the groups that comprise the visible minority population.¹¹

10 Milan and Hamm (2004) looked at common-law and legal marriages in mixed and homogenous visible minority couples. They find that 3.2 per cent of couples were in mixed unions in 2001, up from about 2 percent in 1991. Most of these were visible minority with non-visible minority. However, not all visible minority groups are equally likely to form mixed unions. The visible minority ethnic origin categories with the highest ‘mixed-union’ rates are Japanese (70 per cent of all unions), Latin American (45 per cent), or Black (43 per cent) ancestry. Korean, Chinese, and South Asians were the least likely visible minorities to be involved in such mixed unions (see also Lessard 2002; Kalbach 2002).

11 Changes in the visible minority-white earnings differential are impossible to calculate because visible minorities who also have European heritage are counted in the visible minority group total (i.e., people with both Chinese and British ethnic origins are counted as Chinese for the purposes of employment equity). This leaves only changes in the gross composition of the visible minority category (i.e., proportion of Chinese versus proportion of Black or South Asian). However, an examination of the 2001 base populations and the 2017 projected populations reveals that the proportions of all the groups are very similar in both time periods. This suggests that the gap would not be affected by the changing mix of visible minorities if the proportion of single to multiple origin visible minorities does not change a lot.

“Immigrant poverty” will remain an issue until the underlying circumstances are removed. These are generally agreed to include recognition of foreign credential and competencies and work experience, reluctance to hire immigrants, issues of immigrant integration into the workplace and in some cases discrimination. In the past this has been a problem for the immigrant alone, but in today’s workforce, where skills shortages are growing, this becomes a problem for the employer as well. And in turn it becomes a problem for the economy.

6.3.3 Religion

In some senses religion has always been at the heart of Canadian history, and more to the point, controversy brought on by religious differences did take place. In the early years, before and after Confederation, religious differences between Protestants and Catholics played a major role in the development of the country. The fact that these religious denominations also followed the linguistic and cultural English and French Canadian communities only exacerbated some historic developments. Through the earlier part of the twentieth century, residential schools were set up for Aboriginal children, most of which were run by religious orders. The controversial aspects of that system are still with us.

Today, in most parts of the country the Protestant-Catholic schism has largely dissipated as both groups tend to be more comfortable in seeing themselves as simply Christians. This is partly due to a growing secularization in Canada which is perhaps more evident among those from Christian backgrounds. However, the rise of evangelical Christianity may accentuate these differences over time.

Christianity is both a religion and a major aspect of culture for many people. While many Christians may not be following religious observances on a regular basis, they do follow the wider cultural aspects of Christianity and we do live in a society that follows laws akin to Christian law. Many non-observant Christians will celebrate Christmas and Easter. Indeed, Canadian law does follow Christian tenets, with our weekly day off being Sunday, and workers getting days off for Christmas and Good Friday. These are all signs that Canada was built in the Christian mould. While there has been a small but significant Jewish community in Canada for a long time, the issues of its difference from Christians were not that great, there being a general understanding of a Judeo-Christian set of values and norms.

With the change of Canada's immigration system in the 1960s there has been a growth in the number of non-Christians, which has increased more noticeably since the mid-eighties, when the annual level of immigration rose from the 84,000 range to 220,000 and the source countries shifted from Europe to Asia.

The challenge now comes from both a growing non-Christian population and the fact that these non-Christian communities tend to be more observant of religious tenets, which show up in their "differentness" from what is generally practiced in a Christian-based society. Most evident are issues of attire, be it a turban, hijab, or simply being "modestly" dressed, etc. While different forms of dress are not a concern for most Canadians, these religion-based requirements challenge Canadian norms when they deal with issues like required dress and uniforms. The most recent census has shown a dramatic increase in non-Christian groups, a trend which is expected to grow faster in the years ahead.

As outlined elsewhere in this report, there are various controversies that have come up in recent years, such as wearing the turban in the RCMP, celebrating Christmas in schools, wearing the hijab, space for Muslim prayers in universities, etc. It is fair to project that these issues will continue to occupy space in the public policy dialogue in Canada for years to come. Some issues have been addressed and “settled” in some regions but will need to be worked out over again in others.

There will be one stream of issues that can generally be grouped under the heading of “traditional and conservative values,”

and will include issues of attire and clothing, headdress, gender segregation for some activities, such as swimming, sports and entertainment.

A second stream will relate to “religious observation” and cover issues such as religious holidays, time off work for prayer and other religious observances, challenging Christian holidays such as Good Friday, not being able to work—or certain kinds of commercial closings on the Sabbath.

A third kind of issue will be the regular questioning of the “Christian way of doing things,” whether it is the school Christmas concert, or the celebration of Christmas.

6.3.4 Foreign policy

As various ethnocultural communities grow, their influence on Canadian foreign and international policy is growing too. This presents both opportunities and challenges. Opportunities arise because the Government of Canada now has access to a good source of information both for understanding the history of other parts of the world and for gaining perspective on current events. The departments that benefit from such information include primarily Foreign

Affairs, International Trade, Public Safety and the Canadian International Development Agency, and to a lesser extent many other departments that have international branches, such as Health Canada and Canadian Heritage. For example, following the events of Tiananmen Square (China) in 1989, what was then the Department of External Affairs (now Foreign Affairs) brought together individuals from the Chinese Canadian community to seek their views on what Canada should do. This was one of the earlier examples when the department was willing to believe that it was not the only source of information and intelligence and that with rapidly changing events, new sources of information were necessary.

Challenges arise as well. Oftentimes immigrant groups come to Canada because they want to escape the situation back in their country of origin. Sometimes the government they don't like is not particularly liked by Canada either, but other times there may be a need for Canada to maintain relations with that government for more global geo-political reasons. Rightly or wrongly, this situation creates a schism between the community and the Government of Canada.

Consider a complex situation such as the war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, when Israel attacked Hezbollah in Lebanon, in retaliation for the attacks from Hezbollah. The situation (combined with the rise of Hamas in the recent Palestine election) caused a sharp rise in concern among Canadian Jews. The Government of Canada clearly sided with Israel to the satisfaction of Canadian Jews. At the same time, the move left a number of Lebanese-Canadians and Muslim-Canadians very concerned. A number of communities intervened strongly with the Canadian government and Parliament, trying to get them to see the conflict from the communities' perspective and to take their side.

Over the years many groups have maintained an interest in affairs in their country of origin and have worked to gain support of their view. These include ending apartheid in South Africa and restoring democracy in Eastern European countries, which have enjoyed the support of the Government of Canada. In the case of South Africa, the government was certainly more vocal than the Canadian South African community which is very small and dispersed. In the case of Ukraine, the large community in Canada, now two and three generations old, has maintained strong support for independence from Soviet domination. Interestingly, when John Diefenbaker was prime minister he promised to work for Ukrainian independence, something Liberals thought for years was unrealistic and would never happen. History proved Diefenbaker right, even if he didn't live long enough to see it. But in political terms it was one of the factors which made many Canadians of East European origin loyal to the Progressive Conservative party, a loyalty which continues to today's Conservative party.

It is when the "old country" politics takes on a violent turn that a real problem arises. Some two or three decades ago there were minor bombings relating to various differences within communities from the former Yugoslavia. The 1985 Air India bombing is certainly the most violent and destructive terrorist event in Canadian history, driven by the politics of division in India but wreaked upon a planeload of Canadian citizens.

In recent years it has been often suggested that the ban in Canada of particular terrorist groups with foreign roots (such as Babbar Khalsa (a Sikh organization) and the Tamil Tigers) has been hampered by communities within Canada. Some of them have become very active at the riding level within certain political parties, to the extent they can influence, or at least, claim to

influence the outcome of nomination race in a riding or even the outcome of an election in certain ridings where they have significant numbers.

There are various cases where ethnic and visible minority communities have had significant impact on foreign policy. In the wake of the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square, the department of External Affairs (now called Foreign Affairs) invited various community leaders from the Chinese Canadian community to seek their advice. The situation in Beijing was unprecedented and was changing rapidly, so the Canadian government was eager to get all the advice it possibly could and met with the group several times during the crisis.

A more recent example was during the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine. Over the period of November 2004 to January 2005, massive protests followed an election in late November which seemed to be compromised by corruption, intimidation and fraud. The Supreme Court ordered a new vote which took place on December 26. The Canadian government was in regular contact with Ukrainian Canadian community leaders as they were in touch with many people in Ukraine and Kiev, where massive protests were taking place. In the end Canada sent close to 500 election observers, many of whom were Ukrainian-speaking from the Ukrainian Canadian community.

The debate on foreign policy and community involvement will continue, and will increase in the years ahead as communities flex their muscle more and more. It is important for key departments involved in international affairs to engage with these communities and to continue working out the opportunities and limitation for such engagement.

6.3.5 Participation in the democratic process

The participation in the democratic process by ethnic and visible minorities and immigrants can be broken down into to three parts. First is voting behaviour, second is political involvement in general and third is running for office and winning elections.

There is evidence to suggest that voting behaviour of immigrants is no lower than that of Canadian-born people. Pieter Bevelander and Ravi Pendakur (2007) found that immigrant status was not a determinant in whether or not someone votes. Rather, the combination of socio-demographic and social capital attributes had greater influence. With few exceptions (immigrants arriving in their twenties being the major exception), and after controlling for such variables, minorities vote at about the same rate as majority members. This does make sense. Higher levels of education usually results in people being better informed about their government and political system and therefore more likely to participate in some form. Social capital attributes such as sense of belonging at a local level, trust in government, civic awareness and formal interaction with others are also found to be strong drivers of voting.

Among immigrants, political involvement at the grassroots or local level has been increasing significantly over the past two decades, although more so at the federal and provincial than at the municipal level. In the beginning such involvement was most notably in the federal Liberal Party, and focused on nomination meetings for party candidates and delegate selection meetings for leadership conventions, where people from specific groups were signed up in large numbers and corralled into coming to vote for specific candidates. Interestingly, the candidates were often not from minorities in the early years of this practice. Over time, the practice continued and spread to other parties,

and gradually the candidates were turning out to be from minorities. At first large numbers of people from certain groups would be supporting candidates of their origin, and as time passed, there would be more than one candidate from a single group, especially if it was a large community in a particular riding. There were also cases where political organizers from different groups would get together behind certain candidates. These phenomena are present both for ethnic-based groups and for religious group, be that the Sikh community or Christians.

At the municipal level, ethnic participation has been very low. It is likely that the higher participation rates in provincial and federal politics is in part a function of the organized party system, where relatively small numbers of people can get candidates nominated. Within the party system the members have all shown some level of interest in signing up, whereas in a municipal ward, even though there may be as few as ten thousand people, most have not committed to be part of a voting group.

When it comes to candidates for public office, the number from minorities is much lower than their numbers in society, especially when you consider the number of candidates who get elected. There are cases of municipal councils where the number of minorities in a given riding is around the 50 per cent mark and there may be either no or one single minority person elected to council, examples being Markham and Richmond Hill in Ontario and Richmond in British Columbia.

In the House of Commons, the last couple of elections have produced more minority MPs than in the past (about 15 in the present and previous parliaments). These minorities include MPs from South Asian, Chinese, Japanese, Arab, Haitian and African backgrounds. This is only about 5 per cent of all

MPs, which is significantly less than the 12 to 15 per cent minority population in Canadian society over this time period. Is this reasonable? To a large degree the answer to this question depends on who one expects to run for office. While it is true that a number of MPs and MLAs are immigrants, it should be recognized that the integration and acclimatization process takes time.¹² Given that the majority of visible minorities are immigrants, it is probably not surprising that the proportion is as low as it is. However, it is not unreasonable to think that Canadian-born minorities will have about the same propensity to run for political office as the majority. This suggests that as the number of Canadian-born visible minorities increases, so should the number of visible minorities who seek to get involved in the political process.

6.3.6 Canadian culture

As the nature of Canada's population evolves, Canadian culture evolves along with it. Various federal cultural institutions play a role in this definition and many have begun to make changes in recent years. The issues apply to showing diversity in film and television, the institutions being the National Film Board, Telefilm Canada and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. A number of interesting films and television shows have been produced which reflect Canadian diversity and allow for the diversity of *Canadian* stories to be told, although this progress is at an early stage.

Diversity can also present its challenges. An exhibition at the Royal Ontario Museum in Toronto in 1989–1990 called "Into the Heart of Africa" became a matter of significant controversy. It depicted Africa through the eyes of Canadian troops and Protestant missionaries in an earlier era. There were several images and attitudes displayed which were quite negative to-

¹² Further, the immigration selection program does not offer any points for prospective immigrants who suggest that their occupation of choice is "politician."

wards Africans. There was a significant outcry from parts of the Black and African Canadian community, which ended with the resignation of the Curator of Ethnology at the museum, Jeanne Cannizzo. Subsequently and following wide consultation, the Royal Ontario Museum had another exhibition that had a portrayal of Africans which met with a different appreciation.

The controversy also caused other organizations to examine their practices, leading to a new program focusing on cultural diversity by the Toronto Arts Council, which went into effect in the early nineties and proved to be successful in supporting artistic endeavours of many minority communities in Toronto. Prior to this period, the TAC focused on mainstream cultural activity. Opening its funding to minority arts meant creating boards capable of assessing such artistic forms as Chinese opera and Indian dance. The Ontario government has also appointed several visible minorities to the Board of Trustees and Board of Governors.¹³

As much as some critics will condemn the communities who objected and demonstrated, it is instructive to compare that episode to the more recent controversy at the War Museum in Ottawa in 2007, where several veterans groups strongly objected to the words on a particular panel concerning attacks on Germany during World War II, which they believed could suggest Canadian troops were guilty of war crimes. This controversy went all the way to the Senate, which conducted hearings and called for the wording to be changed, and ended with the resignation of the director Joe Geurts.

Generally speaking the trend has been that where institutions are proactive and take initiatives to bring diversity into their mainstream, the results

¹³ Minorities can also be a source of funding. Over the past year the ROM has opened a spectacular new wing following a major donation from businessman Michael Lee-Chin (of West Indian origin), called the Michael Lee-Chin Crystal.

can be positive and controversy can be avoided. This is a good lesson for all cultural institutions, but not a guarantee that cultural controversy will not occur.

6.3.7 Broadcasting

While there is movement to have Canadian broadcasters do a better job in reflecting the diversity of Canadians the other challenge in our broadcasting system is from foreign broadcasting services.

In the early part of this decade there had been growing pressure on the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission to allow a rapid increase in the number of Canadian television channels, especially in languages other than English and French—the “third languages.” Canadians are now able to get an increasing number of foreign services directly, rather than depend on Canadian-owned third-language services which contained Canadian and foreign programming. As a result, people can now be fully entertained and informed by television without watching a minute of Canadian television. It is important to remember that English-language television is also predominantly foreign (read American), although its saving grace is that many viewers do watch the high-quality Canadian-produced news and current affairs, and further, American entertainment programming is in many ways mainstream in Canadian society.

While the arrival of foreign third-language services is a relatively new phenomenon, it certainly poses a question of whether this will undermine a cultural and emotional loyalty or attachment to Canada for those that consume primarily non-Canadian television. It is also probable that the interest in foreign and foreign-language programming is of greater importance to immigrants, and not so much to second and subsequent generations. But it is also

conceivable that to today's immigrant groups, this reduction in foreign-language interest will not reduce as fast as it has in the past, as new immigrant communities are more culturally different from the Canadian mainstream and may be more interested in geo-political issues, a result of the changing technology and changing world affairs.

6.3.8 Reasonable accommodation

While the term "reasonable accommodation" has been around for a while in Canadian human rights law, it has taken on new importance in Quebec with the appointment of the Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles (Consultation Commission for Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences).

The commission has a threefold mandate: to draw up an accurate portrayal of how exactly accommodations are being made; to conduct a wide-scale inquiry in all regions of the province to find out what Quebecers are really thinking "beyond polls and spontaneous reactions"; and to come up with recommendations on how accommodations can be made that are "respectful of the common values of Quebecers."

This follows a number of situations or incidents in Quebec which raised concerns about how Quebec society and local norms were being challenged by particular communities that wanted things done differently. Cultural diversity has a particular relevance in Quebec where the degree of cultural insecurity is greater than elsewhere in Canada. The issue of cultural maintenance for francophone Quebec naturally is of significant interest.

The debate and the results of this commission, due in early 2008, provides an opportunity for a very useful dialogue on the degree of reasonable accommodation that can be expected by both newcomers and those already here.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The last half century has witnessed incredible social, demographic, economic and cultural change. The policies that were put in place through this period (the Canadian Human Rights Act, the changes to immigration policy, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the Employment Equity Act, etc.) are sound public policies meant to respond to these changes.

Despite these efforts, however, there remains substantial inequality which appears to be embedded in Canadian society. In particular, visible minorities, even those born in Canada, face significant earnings penalties in the labour market, despite having more or less similar upbringings, education and aspirations. Given that the visible minority population is expected to increase dramatically over the next decade, such discrimination will become even more important to combat. However, present day policies do not appear up to the task.

On the social side, as the number of visible minorities grow and the population becomes even more ethnically, religiously and socially diverse, we should be prepared to continue debate on what it means to be Canadian. The core of these debates will focus on what constitutes reasonable accommodation of our new citizens and what is outside the boundaries. It is all too facile to conclude that we should throw out any of the foundational policies which are designed to instill equality and harmony. The fact that Canada is diverse today and will be even more diverse tomorrow is non-negotiable. The projections by Statistics Canada point to a Canada which will be a microcosm of the world, and increasing reliance on immigration to bolster our population will simply add to this. Our challenge as a society is to constantly work our way

through each of the controversies which will undoubtedly arise as we fully enter the 21st century.

If the current demographic trends are extended into the next half century, it is undoubtedly the case that the non-white population will grow by leaps and bounds, particularly since intermarriage will result in the rapid increase of people classified as visible minority. Thus the social changes witnessed over the last half century may be mirrored in the next five decades. It is not clear to us that governments are spending the time and energy required to plan for such fundamental change. Perhaps it is time to think outside the box about the kinds of government structures capable of addressing issues of diversity at the federal, provincial and municipal level.

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